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European Parliament hits 
out at Indonesia again 
On 10 July, the European Parliament called on Indonesia 
to end its occupation of East Timor so that conditions 
could be created for an act of self-determination. The 
resolution was adopted by a 162 to 42, with 30 
abstentions. The initiative was taken by Portuguese 
members who joined the Parliament in January this year, 
when Portugal became amemberof the European Community. 
Other MEPs sponsoring the resolution were from Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Holland and the 
UK. 
The resolution appealed to Indonesia to cease all 
hostilities against the people of East Timor 
immediately, end their occupation of the country and 
respect the rights of the Maubere people to self-
determination. It called on the European Community to 
ensure that proper conditions are created to allow the 
East Timorese people to enjoy this right. 
It urged EEC Member States to use al 1 possible 
diplomatic channels to attain peace and law in East 
Timor and to demand that the Maubere people take part in 
negotiations concerning East Timor's future. 
It asked Portugal to join in Community efforts to 
ensure that East Timor's independence is guaranteed, in 
line with the provisions of the Portuguese Republic. 
Indonesia's illegal occupation 
The early part of the resolution recalled that 
Indonesia has been in occupation of East Timor by force, 
A photo of Fretilin guerrillas token in January this year 
in defiance of international law, since December 1975. 
It recalled past UN resolutions of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council, and of the Human Rights 
Com mi tteeond Minori t iesSubcommit tee, ocknow I edging East 
Timor's right to self-determination and asking Indonesia 
to remove its troops from the territory. 
It referred to the positions on East Timor taken by 
Indonesian and Portuguese bishops and to the statement of 
the Pope in July 1984, calling on Indonesia to respect 
human rights in East Timor. It recoiled the Portuguese 
people's support for East Timor's inalienable right to 
self - determination in conformity with Portugal's 
Constitution [Article 297), which states that Portugal is 
"bound by its responsibility to promote and guarantee the 
right of East Timor to independence". 
Unanimous resolution in Portuguese Parliament 
On 17 July, while Indonesia was celebrating the tenth 
anniversary of its annexation of East Timor, the 
Portuguese Parliament unanimously passed a resolution 
denouncing Indonesian genocidal practices in East Timor. 
Re-off irm ing East Ti mor's right to self-determination, 
the resolution said the annexation and the subsequent 
fighting and famine "demonstrate Jakarta's disrespect of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of the most 
bosi c norms of i nternat i ono l relations and of 
recommendations and decisions taken by the UN, calling 
for a negotiated settlement". 
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C:::J Zone virtually under Indones i an military control. 
-Zone where there is a limited presence of guer r illa 
--- troops. I I Zone . practically under the control of f alintil 
guerrilla units. 
q50} 
-• 
The bases of the autonomous guerrilla units. 
Location of concentration camps along Indonesi an-
controlled roads, and at agricultural production sit e s. 
Location of concentration camps remote f rom 
agricultural production sites. 
----------
Usable roads. Unusable roads. 
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Fretilin's map of Indonesian 
concentration camps 
In the last Bulletin, we reproduced a map of East Timor 
combining information contained in two maps smuggled out 
by Fretil in, one from the Indonesian army showing 
guerrilla positions, and one by Fretilin showing 
Indonesian military positions. The second Fretilin map 
n~ceived at that time, which we reproduce opposite, 
gives details of Indonesia's territorial control. The 
map was drawn by Xanana Gusmao, commander-in-chief of 
the armed resistance movement, Falintil. 
Autonomous units in the west 
It shows that in the western sector, Indonesian control 
is virtually complete, except for the presence of three 
autonomous guerrilla units. These units do not fall under 
the Falintil structure but are under the direct command 
of Xanana. They consist mostly of Timorese who have 
defected from the Indonesian side in the post four years 
or so. Most received basic military training in the 
Indonesian army or police force during the early 1980s, 
when Indonesia tried out a policy of 'Timorisation' of 
th~ . war. They served in one or other of the para-
m d 1tary forces used by the Indonesian high command, 
Hansip, Wanra, Kamra or TBO. [See Budiardjo and Liem, 
The War against East Timor, Zed Books, 1984 for an 
analysis of this pol icy.] 
Details about these para-military forces is contained 
In an Indonesian military document smuggled out of East 
Timor in June this year. This 'Operational Instruction' 
issued in 1982 was captured by Fretilin on 28 August 
Concentration ca 11 ps 
1. T utuala 
2. M ehara/Porla m ano 
J. Pores/ Assalaino track 
4. Com 
5. L aute m 
6. Rage - L aute m track 
7. L ospalos 
8. M uapitine 
9. llilapa 
1 O. M aluro 
11.Leuro 
12.Laleno 
13. Tutumboro 
14. L uro 
15.Iliomar 
16.Laivai 
17.Laga 
18. Saelari 
19. A telari 
20.Baguia 
21. U atu K arabau, old post 
22.Loi Ulo 
23. New post 
24. Kapuas Camp 
25. Alia m bata 
26. Uatulari 
27.Kelikai 
28. r atu m aka/Seical track 
from ratumaka 
29. B aucau 
JO. B erec oli 
31. Venilale 
32 ••••• camp, south of 
the River Assalaitula 
JJ. Nahareka & Uaibobo 
camps 
34. Ossu 
35. Track from M eabuti to 
L ug asa 
36. Beaco 
37. Viqueque 
38. Bua Nura 
39.Liaruka camp/Bubuana 
40. L oilubo/ Ostico track 
41. Bucoli/Ualakam a 
42. Uai-ra camp 
43. K airabela/Ve m asse 
44. L aleia 
4 5. C airui 
46. K aju laran K lalerek 
Mutin Bikarin 
47. Luca 
48. Bubur Lico 
49.0ilor 
50. L acluta (vacant) 
51. B arike (only Indonesian 
Army) 
52.Kribas 
5 J. M anatuto 
54. L aclo 
55. Bettau (Ili m anu) 
56. Malians(?) 
57. L aclubar 
58.Soibada 
59. Mane Hat 
60.Natar Bora 
61. r atu B erliu 
62. Alas 
6 J. Beta no track 
64.Same 
6 5. M aubisse 
66. Ainaro 
67.Hudo 
6B. M ape 
69. Bobonaro 
70. Atsabe 
71. L etefoho 
72.Maliana 
73.Suai 
74. Erm era 
75. Aileu 
76. Vicinity of Oili 
77. Maulau 
1983. It describes the use the army was making at the 
time, of Timorese conscripts and provides the best 
insight yet of how these para-military units function. 
Honsip [Pertahanan Sipil or Ci vi 1 Defence] are used to 
protect and guard villages. Whereas in Indonesia, 
Honsips are generally nothing more than night-watchmen, 
in East Timor, Hansip troops are required to take port in 
military operations, in pursuit of guerrilla units. 
Wonro [Perlawanan Rakyat or People's Resistance) are 
units directly under the command of the regional military 
command known as K orem. 
Komra [Kea m anan Rakyat or People's Security] are units 
under the command of the pol ice force. 
TBO [Tenaga Bantuan Operasi or Auxiliary Operational 
Forces] are Timorese who accompany Indonesian troops 
while out on operations, with no operational function but 
to assist as bearers and carriers for the troops. 
In late 1983, after the breakdown of the March-August 
1983 ceasefire, a large number of Timorese conscripts in 
these units defected, taking their arms, and joined 
Fretilin in the bush. Many of these are now with the 
autonomous units operating in the western sector. 
The triangle-shaped, shaded zone, running along the 
north coast several kilometres to the east of Dill, is 
under Indonesian control, with a limited presence of 
guerrilla forces. 
Fretilin-controlled areas and the concentration comps 
The area shown in white is virtually under Fretilin 
control, except for the roads (or tracks) and comps 
which are under Indonesian military control. Timorese 
villagers ore concentrated in the camps numbered in 
Xanono's mop from 1 - 77. They ore known to the Timorese 
as 'concentration comps'. [For the names, see list.] 
The larger black blobs indicate the location of a 
group of comps situated along the roads and in 
agricultural production sites; the smaller dots indicate 
comps that are situated for from the production sites. 
The Portuguese term used by Xanona for the roods or 
tracks linking some of the camps is linha which is best 
translated as 'track' rather than rood. 
Fourth map sent out by Fretilin 
The 77 comps shown in the present mop ore by no means 
the complete story. Yet another mop which reached Lisbon 
lost month gives for greater details of camp locations 
in certain regions. The map is very large (1.10 by 1.20 
cmsas compared with the previous mops which were only A4 
size). It covers only the eastern tip of East Timor. 
In its original form, as captured from the Indonesians 
on 20 December 1985, it was a mop of the Topographical 
Department of the Indonesian army, presumably used for 
operational purposes, showing only geographical features. 
Before sending it out, Fretilin added a great amount of 
detail, showing for instance operations launched by the 
guerrillas since the breakdown of the ceasefire. Camp 
locations ore also shown in great detail. There are, for 
instance, a number of camps in and around Lospalos. 
We plan to reproduce sections of the mop in forthcoming 
issues of the Bulletin. 
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Weapons pylon photo received from East Timor 
A weapon shown in a photograph received this month from 
Fretilin has been identified for TAPOL by a disarmament 
expert as a weapons pylon, most likely carried on an A-4 
Skyhawk or 5-F E, both of them fighter-bombers supplied to 
Indonesia by the US. The photo provides concrete proof 
that these fighter-bomber aircraft were in action in East 
Timor in late 1985 or early January. 
The photograph was on one of four reels smuggled out of 
East Timor by Fret ii in, which reached Lisbon in June this 
year. The photographs were taken in January 1986. 
Identification by Sussex University Disarmament 
Information Unit 
The Armament and Disarmament Information Unit of the 
Science Policy Research Unit of the University of Sussex 
identified it as a weapons pylon from an aircraft, most 
likely a fixed-wing aircraft. The pylon "has six ejector 
release units (ERUs) which are the actual cradles for the 
weapons. There are three ERUs at each end of the pylon, 
allowing six bombs (or other weapons) to be carried". The 
pylon as photographed is lying face up, i.e. 'upside 
down' from the way it would normally be fixed to the 
aircraft, with three ER Us nearest the camera - one on 
either side of the pylon, and one on 'top'. 
The ADIU expert believes the pylon is locally-built. 
Checking the load capacity of the OV-10, the A-4 and the 
F -5E, he excludes the OV-10 Bronco whose wing pylons can 
only carry 600 lbs and its under-fuselage pylon 1,200 
lbs. It seems more likely to have come from an A-4 or F-
5E plane. The latter has provision for a 'Multiple 
Ejector Rack' on the under-fuselage pylon, allowing it to 
carry up to nine 500lb bombs. 
"It's not possible to say what kind of bombs might have 
been involved - could be anything from leaflets to 
napalm. One interesting point is that pylons are not 
normally jettisoned, suggesting the the photo is taken at 
the site of a crash - the bamboo and vegetation appear to 
be burnt." 
A4-Skyhawks were supplied by Israel 
The Skyhawks which carry this type of weapon were part 
of a US-arranged Israeli sale to Indonesia in 1979, when 
INTERVIEW 
18 of these aircraft were supplied specifically for use 
in East Timor. The Age, Melbourne [25 October 1983] 
revealed that Skyhowk missions over East Timor hod 
dropped T AL-1 cluster bombs, mode by the Israeli 
Armament Development Authority (Rafael) of Haifa. [See 
"Israel's mission in Asia", by David Potterson, in Free 
Palestine, Australia, No 40, May-June 1986] 
Portuguese journalists intervieW" Xanana 
A group of Portuguese journalists submitted questions to X anana G usm ao, F retilin leader and com m ander of F retilin 's armed 
wing, F alintil. The answers were published in a number of Portuguese newspapers on 17 July. We reproduce below excerpts 
from this important interview. Other excerpts will be reproduced in our next issue. 
Q: How do Falintil forces compare with Indonesian forces 
in terms of military strength? 
Jn the field of combat, the Indonesians are in a 
superior position and out-number us by ten or fifteen to 
one. Part of the occupying forces, including heavy 
artillery and the tank. di vision - a contingent of around 
five to eight battalions - have secured certain sections 
of the roads, towns and camps. They also hold strategic 
points in the interior of our territory, from which thelj 
launch clean-up operations. Or they move out from these 
points to carry out reconnaissance operations, going 
from one region to another or actually conducting 
si maltaneous operations throughout the country. Bronco 
aircraft also frequently go out on military operations. 
Q: Does Indonesia control the entire territory? 
No, never during the past decade of fighting have the 
Indonesians controlled the entire territory. Had that 
been the case, armed resistance would never had existed. 
Q: Does Fret i I in hove 1 iberoted zones? 
In a guerrilla war lik.e ours, when one is dealing with 
such a small territory, we define liberated areas as the 
extensive areas we inhabit. To give you a general idea, 
for each cluster of camps within a town or for any ca mp 
outside a town, there is a demarcation area within which 
the inhabitants are permitted freedom of m ave m ent. This 
area includes a 500-700 metre wide strip running round 
the outer rim of the camps. Inside these areas, people 
are allowed to cultivate vegetable gardens. 
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There is also a strip of land, approxi m atellJ one 
kilometre wide, beyond the demarcation area, which 
serves as a transitional zone between the occupied 
territories and our territories. These transitional 
zones are patrolled daily blJ ene m IJ troops, although 
m ilitarlj activities are not carried out there regularllJ 
once they leave. Thus, when IJOU step outside these 
transitional zones, or even within these zones, you are 
on land that is controlled blJ Falintil. 
Q: Where in particular? 
It wouldn't be eaSIJ to describe all the liberated 
areas where we are active. To do so, we would have to 
set out, town blJ town, the disposition of the camps, the 
areas in remote regions and the towns and camps thelJ 
might include, and so on. One would need to mark out a 
geographical area covering most of East Tim or, an 
extensive and laborious task. I think we can't stand 
before IJOU gentlemen and give you a clear idea of which 
land is under Indonesia's control and which is in 
guerrilla hands. 
Nevertheless, we can confirm that 80 to 85 per cent of 
the eastern point sector is under Fretilin control, and 
the same is true in the central region. In the border 
region, the entire southern strip, between 
Betano/Sam e/ Bobonaro, follows the same pattern of 
demarcation described above. 
[Xanana then gives a detailed description of camps and 
areas under Indonesian or Fretilin control on a 
particular stretch of road in the eastern sector. Sadly, 
space does not permit us to reproduce this interesting 
account.] 
Q What is the relationship between the guerrillas and the 
inhabitants of the zones where you are active? 
The same blood runs in our veins. The same thoughts, 
desires and aspirations live in our souls. The same 
concerns, hopes and determinations beat in our hearts. 
The same sufferings, sacrifices and weaknesses rend our 
bodies. There IJOU have it. ... I'm not onllJ referring to 
the inhabitants of the zones with our m ilitarlj presence. 
I'm also talking about the people who live in the zones 
where only our political influence is felt. 
Q: Do you think you can defeat the Indonesians 
militarily, or will East Timor's independence come as a 
result of profound political change in Indonesia? 
INTERVIEW 
fretilin has no illusions about defeating Indonesia 
m ilitarillj, but the Indonesians have set them selves a 
difficult task, trljing to obliterate the guerrilla 
movement. Yes, I think we should commit ourselves to 
provoking change in Jakarta. We know this isn't easlJ but 
I think we shouldn't exhaust our energies working far 
this end. I salJ this because Indonesia relies on the 
support of many countries that want to maintain goad 
relations with Jakarta. 
European governments could exert a positive influence 
in the solution of our problem if their policies 
corresponded with their principles, or, better still, 
with certain universal principles. We notice for example 
how the British Prime H inister zealousllJ defends the 
right to self-determination of the small population of 
the Falklands/Halvinasislands. But we can be sure she 
will not show the least concern for the East Tim orese. 
Closer to home, the Australians who seem so concerned 
over the continued presence of the French in New 
Caledonia, tell as we should consider ourselves lucklJ ta 
call ourselves Indonesians. When referring to Kampuchea 
or Afghanistan, they speak of outside aggressors, 
invading forces and so on, but on East Tim or, they go so 
far as to speak about the "Indonesian liberation forces". 
Not Jong ago, Hochtar confirmed that Indonesian generals 
have ambitions for East Timorandassertedthatthe West 
"has started to see East Tim or in the light of certain 
realities," namellJ closer economic ties with Jakarta. 
Q: Lately, people who have visited East Timor from the 
International Red Cross have said the situation in East 
Timor has improved and that one can detect signs of 
progress and growth. What do you think of these reports? 
Statements like this get us nowhere, absolutely 
nowhere. We don't randomly condemn everything in sight 
out of principle. Our perspective is tempered by our 
principles, our values. Without a set of principles to 
serve as your beacon, IJOU deny the political nature, the 
moral and ethical value of the sanctions needed against 
South Africa. Without principles to guide us, no-one 
would cheer the return to democracy in countries once 
under dictatorial rule. We are certain that Pretoria 
would encourage "progress and growth" - perhaps on an 
even grander scale - in Namibia. Does this therefore 
Fretilin's commander-in-
chief, Xanana Gusmao, at 
work with his radio 
transmitter. {From the set 
of F retil in photos taken in 
January this year). 
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superc ede the Namibi an people's right to independence? 
TodalJ, the si tuation i n Chile and the Philippines makes 
m anlJ people appre hensive. Does the question of rights 
onllJ arise when the (econom i c ) situation deteriorates? 
In effect, reports of progress and growth lend weight 
to the l ine favo ured bl) Indonesia. Numerous red herrings, 
including p oli ti cal ones, serve this purpose. Their aim 
is t o di stract world public opinion so that outsiders 
for get Indonesia's m ilitarlJ occupation of our homeland 
and the criminal repressi on of our people. 
We think these statements were made bl) people whose 
opi ni ons were jaundiced, once the Indonesians could 
mani pulate them. Furthermore, we see these allegations 
as a grave insult to our people who, across the land, 
are dlji ng o f hunger and disease because much-needed aid 
has not reached them. 
We certainllJ do not want to disparage the valiant work 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
which has alleviated the sufferings of our people during 
the most critical periods of our struggle to survive. 
Howe ver, one must not overlook the truth. 
At this moment, in many parts of the interior of our 
country, namely in the east, and in the southern part of 
the central region, the people, plagued by hunger and 
rickets, hope that people from the IC RC will distribute 
food. Victims of grave illnesses would like the IC RC to 
administer more effective and intensive treatment (than 
they now get). 
We understand that the policy of the IC RC is to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the wounded and mutilated 
during a state of war, without restriction. The only 
exception is treatment of guerrillas (&lthough up till 
now, we have never requested their assistance). We would 
now like to ask the ICRC to persuade the Indonesian 
government to permit it to treat injured guerrillas and 
captives [prisoners of war], in order to prevent the 
occupying forces from amputating [the limbs of] victims, 
solely for the purpose of disabling them. I should add 
that we express our reservations as to the authenticity 
of these charges. 
Q: Are the people who inhabit East Timor mostly of 
Maubere descent or has there been a transmigration 
EAST Tl MOR 
project carried out by the Indonesian government? 
People salJ D ili has been Ja vanised and you can see 
convoys of Indonesians arriving in East Tim or. However, 
the armed uprising of August 198J had a negative effect 
on transmigration projects in certain agricultural 
regions such as Lospalos, Natar Bora and Ue Berek. 
These projects only benefit the Indonesians, while 
recently, Jakarta had to re-launch its plan to obliterate 
the Haubere people. The town of Barike, for instance, has 
been at the centre of military operations since the 
second half of 1984. One can presume that this will be to 
prepare it to meet the security and acco m m odation needs 
for longterm settlement of Indonesians. 
Q: How do you regard Portugal's policy towards East 
Timor, as defended by the President at the UN? And how do 
you view the negotiations taking place between Portugal 
and Indonesia under the Secretary-General's auspices? 
Extremely positively, insofar as it reaffirms the 
policy line of Portugal with regard to East Tim or. 
Bearing in mind the prolonged suffering of our people, 
we can only hope the next president [Dr Mario Soares] 
maintains this position, so that concrete gains can be 
made. 
I would like to appeal to the Portuguese Parliament 
and the present government in Lisbon to take up the 
defence of the East Tim orese who, for four centuries, 
were subjugated by the Portuguese. I appeal to Dr Cavaco 
Silva to promote the just cause of East Tim or, making up 
for the ten years in which there was a blatant lack of 
political initiative regarding East Tim or. 
As for the talks now in progress between Portugal and 
Indonesia, I should first express our apprehension. 
While the subject matter is dear to our lives, our very 
existence, our interests and our people's heritage, we 
have not been called to speak. The very fact that we 
have been excluded is in contradiction of the principles 
of the UN Charter, as is the fact that they are holding 
talks on secondary questions, ignoring the fundamental 
issues these discussions should raise. These are the 
principles of the inviolability of frontiers, the right 
to self-determination, the principle which calls for 
referendums in certain cases. 
It is obvious that these fundamental issues are being 
ignored. The repatriation of form er officials i m mediately 
reveals such inconsistencies •..• 
International Red Cross misused 
Misuse by Indonesia of abridged versions of confidential 
reports compiled by the International Committee of the 
RedCross(ICRC)has helped Indonesia convince members of 
the UN HummRightsCommissiontoremove East Timor from 
its agenda. Such reports hove given a one-sided picture 
to UN agencies of the reality in East Timor. Meanwhile, 
the ICRC has ignored appeals by various NG Os in Geneva to 
publish rectifications of such deceptions, but instead, 
has given confidential information (about East Timor) in 
talks with western diplomats. 
This revelation is contained in an article in the Dutch 
daily, Trouw [19 June 1986], quoting at length Adrien-
Claude Zoller, the permanent representative of Pax 
Christi in Geneva. 
It is a golden rule of the ICRC to preserve political 
neutrality. Its reports "never speak out about the 
political situation in a particular country. According 
to the same golden rule, governments are not supposed to 
publicise anything from ICRC reports unless they publish 
the reports in their entirety. If a government fails to 
comply with this rule, the ICRC should publish a 
rectification which, in diplomatic circles, is regarded 
as a serious disgrace". 
Moreover, human rights NGOs attending the UN Human 
R ights Commission in Geneva "have expressed grove 
disquiet at the appearance of abridged reports about 
lCRC activities in East Timar in the official ICRC 
bulletin". Such one-sided accounts have been circulated 
by the Indonesian delegation, in order to influence the 
outcome of Commission deliberations on East Timor. In 
fact, it was such a deceptive use of ICRC information 
that made it possible for Indonesia to convince members 
of the Human Rights Commission to delete East Timar from 
its agenda last year. 
Zoller told the newspaper there are two possible 
interpretations of the ICRC's indefensible behaviour. 
The first is that the agency is afraid to raise its voice 
against a cruel occupying power. The second is far more 
sinister, namely that the Red Cross has made a deal with 
Indonesia, "namely that publication of information in 
ICRC bulletins is the condition for the ICRC being 
allowed to remain in East Timor. But as yet we are not 
in possession of documents to prove this." ' 
Trouwreports that ICRC bulletin reports have mentioned 
ICRC visits undertaken, but omit to say anything about 
restrictions imposed on its activities in East Timor. It 
has only been allowed to visit 150 political prisoners, 
and only visits one of the many places of detention. Such 
reports create the impression that the Red Cross can 
Continued on next page 
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operate freely in East Timor and that its reports give a 
true account of the situation as a whole. 
Limited role of the ICRC 
Continuing the investigation of the ICRC''s role in East 
Timor, Robin Osborne [ PNG Times, 27 July] reveals that, 
although the agency's Charter requires it to oversee 
areas where armed conflict is occurring, it does not and 
cannot do this in East Timor. "It is denied a permanent 
presence on the mainland". The agency's sole staffer is a 
nurse based on Atauro island, while according to an ICRC 
booklet published recently, its staff travel in Timor 
"amounted to an average 10 hours a month in a chartered 
helicopter and minimal road travel... Its work is 
dependent on the Indonesian government, often the 
military. Being Indonesian, its ground staff are unlikely 
to criticise officialdom." 
It is the ICRC's refusal to complain about these 
arrangements that has angered its critics, writes 
Osborne. 
Australian Labour Party turns its back on 
East Timor 
The Ju 1 y 1986 Conference of the Australian Labour 
Porty turned down a resolution upholding East 
Timer's right to self-determination and instead, 
adopted one accepting the "reality" of East Timor's 
"incorporation" by Indonesia. This stand renders 
meaningless its "regrets" that "an appropriate, 
internot ion ally-supervised act of se 1 f-deterrn ination 1 
has not occurred". 
Mimi Ferreira, representing East Tirnorese refug<:>es 
at the conference, criticised the pol icy, saying 
that AL1st1alia's interest in exploiting oil deposits 
in the waters between Australia and East Timar was 
responsible. Lihernl Party MP, MichtJel t-lodgrnan, 
described the ALP resolution as "morally and legally 
1 
indefensible". 
Jakarta 'celebrates' annexation 
On 17 Ju 1 y, the I ndones ion governrnen t celebrated the 
tenth anniversary of its brutul cmnexot ion of Ec1st Timar, 
which they prde1 to coll 'integrosi'. Alrhough in the 
months before, J<_1korta opp€(Hed lo be rrepuring for U big 
event, it turned out to be very low-profile, with no 
fo1eign j oumulhts invited. 
As in 1976, when the 'bill of integration' was signed 
and very Few foreign repres~ntotives both~red to attend, 
so ten years loter, only six foreign ambossodors turned 
up, from Poland, Romania, Yugosluvin, Morocco, Iron and 
Singapore. rresident Suhnrto also stayed uway, sending 
instead three rninif!~, ·, Aeling Horne Affairs Minish~r 
Genernl Sudharmono,FordgnMinisler Moch tar I< usvmaatmuja 
and Information Mi11iste1 Hmrnoko. The other conspicuous 
absentee wasGenr:-ral Murdani, Armed Forces commander-in-
chief, who no douut stayed away so as not lo al tract 
attention lo the co11tinL•ing high-level military focus on 
Indonesia's "27th province". 
'Special status' criticised 
Some Timorese I ike Governor Currascalao and 'regional 
assembly' Culkar member Clementi no do Reis Amaral, who 
This photograph from The 
Jakarta Post, captioned 
"Warm Welcome", is of East 
Timorese "welcoming 
dignitaries from Jakarta" on 
17 July. There isn't a 
smiling face in sight. 
serve Jakarta in the local administration, used the tenth 
anniversary lo complain al' ;;·ut East Timor still being 
trE'uted us Cl 'special region'. Carroscalao [Kompos, 17 
July l main I y lornented the fact that this status led to 
'dualism', undermining his aut-hority and powers as 
governor. What th is means in fact is that power rests 
with them i I i!ory command because the conduct of the war 
is the primary consideration. 
Amoral [Kompas, 18 July] couched his complaints in 
some pretty frank criticism of Jakarta's much vaunted 
'development' efforts. The vast investment funds were u 
source of corrupt ion. A sports hall in Baucau col lap5ed 
~ .. -fNe the ofrici1_1I opening, while the municipal 
building in Dili was a shambles because of the poor 
quo I ity of materials used. The water-supply system in 
L. iquisa was a di::;aster; pipes were strewn al I over the 
place afte1 c:ornpletion, while the population gained 
nothing from this costly project. 
Whatever the Timorese moy feel about the drawbacks of 
'special <;fotvs', Mochtar mode it clear that this would 
remain for the foreseeable future [Sinor Harapan, 18 
July] 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 76, July 1986 7 
ECONOMICS 
IGGI bolsters a declining economy 
IGGI 1986 commitments 
The breakdown of IGGl's 1986 commitment totalling 
$2.519 million is as follows: 
Bilateral commitments 
For purposes of comparison, the amounts that were 
committed by IGGI member states in 1985 are given in 
brackets: 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Spain 
Switzerland 
UK 
us 
$ 32.49m ( 30.56m) 
$ 6.41m 
$ 7.65m ( 4.75m) 
$ 38.84m ( 29.30m) 
$ 30.00m ( 30.00m) 
$473.57m (303.26m) 
$ 70.96m ( 48.18m) 
$ 2.01 m ( 1.58m) 
$ 12.00m 
$ 8.30m ( 5.49m) 
$ 67.64m ( l 9.28m) 
$ 86.00m (100.00m) 
France and Germany delayed making commitments. 
Austria and Spain joined IGGI this year, and made 
their first commitments. Finland attended the 
meeting as on observer, and committed 12m marks. 
The UK's commitment has increased threefold, more 
At a time of deepening economic cns1s for the 
Indonesian economy, the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (IGGI), meeting in The Hague in June this year, 
agreed to provide Indonesia with economic assistance 
amounting to $2,519 million. This represents an increase 
of more than $100 million over IGGI asssistonce last 
year, and exceeds the amount Indonesia was reported to 
have requested, as recommended by the World Bank. 
Not only was the overall amount increased, but member 
states agreed to provide a certain part of the assistance 
in grants or soft loans. The proportion of grants is not 
known except in the case of the UK [See box], 
Debt burden tops $37 billion 
Indonesia's total foreign debt, not included in the 
IGGl's 1986commitments, is now known to amount to $37.4 
bill ion, of which $28.3 is official (ie. government) 
debt, $3.8 billion is private debt and another $5.3 
billion is short-term debt. It is now calculated that 
the burden of official debt repayment (payment of debts 
falling due plus interest) will this year amount to 28.1 
per cent of estimated foreign exchange earnings (this is 
the so-called debt-service ratio) as compared with 19.7 
per cent in 1985. If the non-official debts are 
included, the debt-service ratio stands at 32.7 per cent 
[World Bank Report on Indonesia, 1986, as quoted in the 
Indonesian and international media] 
The sharp increase in this burden is due on the one 
hand to the inexorable increase in Indonesia's debt, 
added to which is the sharp decline in earnings from ai 1 
exports as a result of the severe price fall since the 
beginning of 1986. 
IGGI commitments went up this year despite the widely 
acknowledged fact that sizable amounts of foreign 
economic assistance committed up to 1985 remain unused. 
Estimates of unused credits range from $3 billion to 
aver $9 bil I ion. 
than any other country. In sterling, it amounts to 
£45 million, of which £5 million is to be given in 
the form of a grant and the rest in the form of soft 
loans to fund projects. The terms of these loans were 
agreed a month after the I GG I meeting: 3 per cent 
interest, repayment over 25 years with a 7 -year grace 
period. The UK is committed to providing £130 mil lion 
in soft loans, making Indonesia the second largest 
recipient of UK soft loans after Chino [Financial 
Times, 18 July]• 
Multilateral agencies 
World Bonk $1.100 
Asian Development Bank$ 500 
UN Dev'ment Programme$ 27 
Internet iona 1 Fund for 
billion (1.2b) 
million (550m) 
million (36.4m) 
Agricultural Dev'ment $ 
Unicef $ 
World Food Programme $ 
EEC $ 
UNFPA $ 
10 mill ion ( 12m) 
13.4 million ( 15m) 
3.5 million 
14.2 million ( 20m) 
2.8 million 
Thus, the burden of providing credit to Indonesia 
hos shifted away from the multilateral agencies. All 
member states, with the exception of the USA, 
increased their commitments this year. 
Why should western countries still wont to put funds 
into the Indonesian economy when it is proving incapable 
of absorbing funds already committed? Why are foreign 
funds being provided even though, according to so many 
circles in Indonesia, a major reason for the 
sluggishness of fund absorption is the shortage not of 
foreign currency (Indonesia's foreign reserves, in any 
case, stand at $10 billion) but of rupiah financing? 
Part of the answer lies in the need of financial 
institutions in the West to keep lending funds to so-
called credit-worthy and politically reliable countries. 
Banks cannot survive without lending money to earn 
interest, which is their primary source of income. So 
many other third world countries ore on the brink of 
bankruptcy that Indonesia still represents a haven for 
financiers in the West looking for countries willing to 
fall ever deeper into debt. 
Harsh words from the Wor Id Bonk 
This is not to say that the World Bank, which oversees 
the Indonesian economy on behalf of the western powers, 
is generally satisfied with the current state of the 
Indonesian economy. Using the most optimistic figures for 
oil prices and state revenues during 1986, the Bank 
forecast that the level of economic growth would stagnate 
at just over l per cent. Several western embassies in 
Jakarta made a far more pessimistic calculation which was 
"leaked" to the Indonesian press shortly before the IGGI 
meeting took place. They estimated that there would be a 
decline of 3 per cent in the level of economic activity. 
These bleak predictions helped fuel pressure for more 
?rasti~ measures to attract foreign investors and give 
incentives to exporters of non-oil products. The Bank 
~eport clearly reflected the dissatisfaction of foreign 
investors who have shown considerable reluctance in the 
last few years to invest in Indonesia. The annual level 
of foreign investment is now well below $1 billion. 
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Primarily, investors baulk at the corruption and the 
special levies required at every turn, all of which has 
earned Indonesia the reputation of having a "high-cost 
(the current euphemism for corruption-ridden) economy" 
Nor do foreign investors like the restrictions placed on 
their freedom to do business. Over the past decade or 
so, the Suharto government has introduced many barriers, 
limiting the scope for foreign investors and requiring a 
percentage of domestic participation in foreign ventures. 
These protectionist moves have served primarily to 
benefit corporations closely connected with the Suharto 
family, as well as helping groups close to the military 
to secure shares In foreign companies. 
The severe decline in earnings from oil exports hos 
made it imperative for Indonesia to promote non-oil 
exports. This the government has been trying to do for 
several years already, but to little effect. Oil still 
accounts for about 70 per cent of Indonesia's foreign 
earnings. The deepening crisis has now given the World 
Bank the chance to insist that the whole structure of 
economic regulation should shift from promoting import-
substi tut ion industries, which is where Suharto's 
business associates have accumulated their wealth, to 
promoting non-oil exports, an area where foreign capital 
is well represented. 
These were the pressures that compelled Indonesia to 
introduce a package of 19 measures on 6 May, know as 
"Pakem" (Pak et E na.m Mei), giving export companies a 
number of incentives. For example, they may now import 
raw materials and capital goods that they were 
previously required to purchase from domestic suppliers 
at much higher prices. This privilege will also apply to 
projects funded with foreign economic assistance. The 
restrictions placed on foreign companies regarding 
domestic participation and the number of years they 
ore permitted to operate, hove also been greatly 
relaxed. In addition, as the result of a decision issued 
in early June, the sectors of economic activity open to 
foreign companies have been drastically increased from 
475 during 1985/86 to 926 in the current year. 
This .year's World Bmk Report on Indonesia was delayed 
until the Pokem regulations hod been introduced. It was 
thus able to welcome the regulations, while expressing 
the hope that this was only the beginning. At the IGGI 
meeting, there was considerable controversy over how much 
more Indonesia would be expected to do to meet the needs 
of foreign investors. According to Kompas [20 June], the 
US delegation was particular adamant on the need for more 
drastic action, while Indonesia's Minister-Coordinator 
for Economic Affairs, Ali Wardhono expressed fears that 
this could have severe consequences for the economy, 
warning even that it could lead to "social unrest". 
According to Kompas, the only countries that came to 
his defence were Australia and the Netherlands. It would 
ECONOMICS 
be hard to prove that Washington's 20 per cent reduction 
in its aid commitment this year [see box] is a sign of 
US disapproval at Jakarta's apparent unwillingness to 
move further, but that may well be the case. 
New regulations not certain to succeed 
In Indonesia, there has been little enthusiasm over 
the Pakem regulations. On the one hand, domestic 
producers who have enjoyed protection from foreign 
competition, now see their role as suppliers to the 
export sector severely curtailed; they will be exposed 
to the winds of competition with no chance to prepare 
themselves. Discontent has been particularly rife among 
members of the association of industrialists, Kadin, who 
complain that the government went ahead with measures 
affecting their interests without consulting with them. 
At the same time, there is no great confidence that the 
new regulations will work in practice. Many of the new 
incentives will have to be administered by bureaucrats, 
giving scope for deals and bribes. For example, to be 
eligible, companies will need to prove that at least 85 
West Papuan, Indonesian, 
Dutch and British 
demonstrators talking to Mrs 
Schoo, outside the Dutch 
Foreign Ministry in The 
Hague, during the IGGI 
meeting in June. [Photo: 
Loth Sorakon] 
per cent of their business is for export. 
It is worth noting, in passing, that the drastic action 
taken last year, shortly before the IGGI meeting, to 
"clean up" customs and excise control, has proven less 
than satisfactory. The government took control out of the 
hands of the Customs and Excise Directorate, and 
appointed a Swiss company, the SGS [Societe Genera.le de 
Survailla.nce] to supervise exports and imports. Suharto 
was highly commended at the time for "boldly" 
disregarding the interests of many hangers-on. 
But it is now publicly admitted that smuggling still 
plagues foreign trade. apparently with the connivance of 
SGS officials. In desperation, KOPKAMTIB chief, General 
Benny Murdani, announced that the Anti-Subversion Low 
would be used against people who violate the terms of 
Suharto's lnpres No 4/1985, proclaimed at the time as the 
definitive measure to end smuggling [ Kompas, 3 June]. 
Suharto family interests at the heart of the matter 
But World Bank, and hence Washington's. disquiet about 
the Indonesian economy goes farther than being worried 
about the level of exports and foreign investment. 
According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (26 June) 
whose Paul Handley, expelled from Jakarta two months ago, 
now writes articles on the Indonesian economy from Kuala 
Lumpur, the central issue is "restrictive licencing and 
other valuable concessions which favour certain 
Continued on next page 
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individuals but disadvantage the economy as a whole." The 
World Bank Report specifically mentions exclusive import 
and purchasing licences for certain petrochemicals and 
steels which are "costing the economy dearly". Handley 
goes on: ''Not mentioned is that these licences have been 
granted to the relatives and friends of the highest 
government officials [read: Suharto], a practice 
underlying most of the protectionist practices." 
This brings us to the contradiction between the 
corporate power of companies aligned to the Suharto 
family (which were so ferociously attacked in the article 
by David Jenkins, published in the Sydney Morning Herald 
on 10 April) C11d foreign, particularly US-based, economic 
interests. It is an open secret in Jakarta that the new 
US ambassador, Paul Wolfowitz, is now actively snooping 
around for "third force" elements, groups apparently 
more amenable to US interests. No-one appears to be more 
irate about such goings-on than General Benny Murdani, 
which may help explain why Wol fowitz was so spectacular! y 
unsuccessful over his attempts to secure entry for two 
ARMS SALES 
Australian journalists attached to the White House press 
corps at the time of Reagan's visit to Bali in May {See 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 75, May 1986]. 
Dissident circles in Jakarta even refer to Murdani as a 
"latter-day Sukarnoist", representing the strong anti-
Americanism and nationalism that prompted Sukarno 
(albeit for very different reasons) to point to the US 
ambassador on one memorable occasion and proclaim, "To 
hel 1 with your aid!". 
It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which 
the current economic er is is may be helping bring to a 
head the simmering contradiction between Suharto-bocked 
corporations and the bureaucrats with the power to 
dispense the favours on which they thrive, on the one 
hand. and foreign investors who see this corporate 
control as a major obstacle to their own exploitation of 
Indonesia's natural resources and cheap labour power. 
[The second port of this article, dealing with the impact 
of the economic crisis on domestic economic interests, 
will appear in the next issue.] 
Battle of the giants 
The leading western manufacturers of fighter aircraft 
are vying with each other to win a big order from 
Indonesia. Until recently, it appeared that the matter 
was already decided. Some time ago, the armed forces 
placed an order for F-16s from the US company. General 
Dynamics and it was recently announced that the Reagan 
Administration is ready to approve the sale. General 
Murdani, armed forces commander-in-chief, has made no 
secret of his strong preference for this aircraft. 
However, it is now clear that the decision is not in 
Murdani's hands. It is very much a matter for B.J. 
Habibie, President-Director of Indonesia's burgeoning 
aircraft company, Industri Pesa wat Terbang Nusantara 
(IPTN). Habibie does not conceal his preference for 
other options. 
Two Europe-based manufacturers are trying to undercut 
the US company. One is the French company, Dassault-
Breguet.which manufactures the Miroge-2000; the other is 
Ponavia, a joint British, Germon and Italian company, 
which manufactures the Tornado. British Aerospace and 
President Suharto arriving at the 
International Air Show in Jakarta. He 
visited the Show no less than three times. 
[Tempo, 28 June 1986) 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) each hold a 42.5 per 
cent interest in Panovia, with Aeritolia holding the 
remaining 15 per cent. 
Economic crisis helps Habibie 
The order, probably initially for eight or twelve 
aircraft, is likely to be worth well over $350 million, 
an enormous drain on the Indonesian economy, now reeling 
from the effects of the oil price collapse and a huge 
foreign debt. (See separate item.) But it is the 
economic crisis that gives Habibie his advantage over 
Murdani, because it makes the terms of the deal far more 
crucial even than the price of the aircraft purchased. 
In Habibie's scheme, these orders must be used to 
promote the manufacturing capability of IPTN. This can 
be achieved by the 'offset' system which means that part 
of the costs would be offset by orders to IPTN for spore-
parts or accessories. He would 1 ike to get at least 50 
per cent 'offset'; recent reports suggest that Dassault 
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is offering for more than that. 
A second alternative is an agreement with the 
manufacturer to allow IPTN to produce the oircraf t under 
licence, the method Habibie has used hitherto with 
Spanish and French aircraft companies. Indeed, this is 
the secret of his success so far. Panavia appears to be 
the most forthcoming in offering this type of scheme. If 
used, it would mean IPTN producing T ornodos not only for 
Indonesia's requirements but for other countries as well. 
Thus, although the Tornado was ·the last to enter the 
race, it may well win the contract. Nor should we forget 
Habibie's special relationship with MBB where he worked 
for many years, rising to the position of a director. He 
is still on their pay-roll as a senior consultant. 
But Dassau It has not stopped at offering 'offset'. The 
company has offered to help IPTN design and build its own 
advanced-technology aircraft. "We would act as 
engineering and technical consultant or even a mere sub-
contractor," soi d one executive. "Better to co-operate 
with Indonesia and win over 30 per cent of workload than 
lose everything in this area" [Flight International, 5 
July 1986]. 
To press their point, Dassault displayed the largest 
number of aircraft of any exhibitor at the International 
Air Show held in Jakarta in July this year. It is no 
coincidence either that President Mitterand is due to 
visit Indonesia in September this year. 
Not to be outdone, General Dynamics have also 
announced that it can offer 'offset' [Kompas, 9 July]. 
International Air Show 
To mark the tenth anniversary of IPTN's establishment 
and to confirm the company's position as a major arms 
manufacturer in the third world, Habibie staged 
Indonesia's first International Air Show in July. 
Altogether 19 countries took part. Fronce was well ahead 
with 46 companies participating. The other leading 
participants were the USA (31 companies), West Germany 
(28), the UK (25) and Netherlands (17). Other countries 
included Singapore, Australia, Spain, Greece, Pakistan 
and Japan. The Soviet Union was to have participated, but 
withdrew at the last minute [Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 
July 1986]. 
B.J. HABIBIE dan CN 235 
Habibie and his 'Tetuko' baby. The name, taken from 
Javanese mythology, was chosen by Suharto. 
Habibie's prime exhibit was the CN-235 aircraft for 40 
to 44 passengers, suitable for civil and military 
purposes. During the Air Show, he signed contracts with 
the domestic airline Merpati National Airlines for 15 
aircraft and with the Armed Forces for six CN-235 of the 
anti-submarine version. By contrast with earlier aircraft 
produced by IPTN under licence from CASA, the Spanish 
aerospace company, the CN-235 is the product of a joint 
venture with CASA. Habibie claims that 180 planes are 
already on order or under consideration in Indonesia and 
abroad. 
ARMS SALES 
Habibie's high-tech dream 
The Air Show received enormous publicity in Indonesia 
as a great national event. Around two million people are 
reported to have visited the Show in less than a week, 
attracted primarily by the aerobatic shows put on, among 
others by a team of Royal Air Force pilots known as The 
Red Arrows, flying Hawk fighter-planes. 
It was an event that served as o distraction from the 
gloomy economic news otherwise f i 11 ing the newspapers. 
For a few days, the impression was created that somehow, 
the leap into advanced technology would resolve the 
country's problems. 
Habibie indeed claims that high-tech industry, with 
arms manufacture at its core, can and must take over as 
Indonesia's major foreign exchange earner. He warned in 
an interview with Tempo [28 June 1986] that efforts to 
make up for the declining oil price by promoting 
traditional non-oil exports are unlikely to succeed. Nor 
can oil be relied upon in the long term to finance 
Indonesia's needs. "Don't be surprised if, in the next 
century, by 2006 or 2016, advanced technology industry 
will account for 60 to 70 per cent of Indonesia's 
foreign exchange earnings." 
He claims that IPTN is already technically capable of 
manufacturing combat aircraft, though he says the 
decision depends on the size of local and regional 
markets. The company will go ahead if demand is more 
than 10 squadrons. If it is only five squadrons or less, 
"We will probably look for licensing from advanced 
aircraft manufacturers" [ Jakart·a Post, 23 June]. 
The changing structure of arms deals 
The style of Habibie's management and the current 
economic crisis mean that, increasingly, arms producers 
in the west find that the best way of doing business with 
Indonesia is by licensing, 'offset' or joint venture 
deals with IPTN or the other branches of Habibie's empire 
(see"Indonesia's Military-Industrial Complex" in TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 73, January 1986). Such arms deals are as 
instrumental as any other in supporting the regime of 
repression and colonial aggression that has its seat in 
Jakarta. No less than 'straight' arms deals, these should 
be the object of campaigning as they are an integral part 
of the policies of western powers in support of the 
Suharto regime. 
BUKU WIRA KARY A: 
BUMI MANUSIA 
(Pramoedya Ananta Toer) 
ANAK SEMUA BANGSA 
(Pramoedya Ananta Toer) 
JEJAK LANGKAH 
(Pramoedya Ananta Toer) 
MEREKA YANG TERBIAR 
(Hasnul Hadi) 
BUMI MANUSIA (Chinese) 
(Pramoedya Ananta Toer) 
TEMBANG JALAK BALI 
The Song of the Starling 
(Putu Oka Sukanta) 
Semua buku ini boleh dipesan secara langsung dari : 
IN SAN 
11. Lorong l l/4E 
46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor 
Diskaun sebanyak I 0% akan diberi 
SIS .00 
SIS.00 I 
SIS.DO 
$6.00 
ss.oo 
$6.00 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 76, July 1986 11 
New arms deals with the UK 
The following updates the current position of the arms 
trade between the UK and Indonesia: 
* Weston Simfire, in a joint venture with the 
Indonesian company L inlibi, hos won on order for its 
Simgun tactical small arms simulator. Simgun is to be 
used with the FNC Herstal (Belgian) and M16 (US) rifles, 
currently used by the Indonesian army [Jane's Defence 
Weekly, 8 March 1986). 
* A Royal Navy survey ship, Hydra, was sold to 
Indonesia in April, the fourth of the second-hand naval 
vessels supplied by Britain. Like the earlier, three 
'Tribal' class frigates, the Hydra is being refitted by 
Vosper Thorneycroft [Jane's Defence Weekly, 26 April 
1986). 
* Negotiations for the sole of Scorpion light tanks, 
manufactured by Alvis, a subsidiary of United Scientific 
Holdings, are still under way [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 
73, January 1986 ].The contract which is believed to be 
worth about £250 million, may include giving Indonesia 
the job of building the basic steel fabrication while the 
high-tech components would be shipped from the UK [The 
Times, 12 April 1986). 
* Marconi Command and Control Systems announced at the 
British Army Equipment Exhibition 1986 that it is pushing 
for the sale of its Digital Fire Control System in 
Indonesia. Trials are due to take place in Indonesia 
later this year, following trials in Thailand and 
Singapore [ Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 June]. 
* IPTN signed an agreement during the Air Show with 
Rolls Royce for authorisation to repair and overhaul 
Rolls aircraft engines manufactured by the British 
company [Jakarta Post, 27 June], A similar agreement was 
signed with Al 1 ison Gas Turbine of the US. This is 
considered to be the first step towards facilitating the 
manufacture of aero-engine components in Indonesia. 
Suharto's private aircraft supplied by British 
Aerospace 
British Aerospace is about to deliver a four-engine 
146-200 type aircraft for President Suharto's 
personal use [Sinor HcitQJ>an, 1 July]. 
Such a deal certainly bo'bsts the company's chances 
of further deals with Indonesia. In addition to the 
16 Hawk fighter planes alread'f' supplied, British 
Aerospace hopes to supply more of this aircraft. "We 
consider (Indonesia) to be one of our most important 
places for supplying the aircraft," said a company 
spokesperson [ Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 July]. 
The former HMS Tartar, a warship of the frigate Type 81/Tribal class which saw service during the Falklands Wa ph~togrophed .°" arrival a.t Tanjung Priok harbour, Jakarta [Jakarta Post, 12 July 1986]. This is the third of thr~ 
fr.1gates ~uppl ied ~o Indones1~ by. the UK, ':1"~ has been. renamed the.KR I Hasanuddin. The refurbished HMS Tartar is equipped 
with anti-submarine aid ~h-atrcraft missiles. It will be based in Tanjung Perak, and will operate in the waters of the 
eastern part ·of the archipelago. 
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CENSORSHIP 
Five more books banned 
Two Pramoedya books banned 
More details hove emerged about the Attorney-General's 
banning of two books by Promoedyo Ananta Toer, Jejak 
Langkah [Footsteps) and Sang Pemula [The Originator1 
reported briefly in TAPOL Bulletin No 75, May 1986. The 
Attorney-General's Decision of 1 May 1986 describes them 
as "historical novels" {Sang Pemula is in fact a 
biography) which "are based on social contradictions and 
the class struggle, guided by 'socialist realism', that 
is to say, the kind of literature promoted by the 
communists". The Decision is based on the 1966 Edict 
banning the Indonesian Communist Porty (PKJ) and 
Marxism, as well as the Interior Minister's 1981 
Instruction regarding surveillance of former PKI 
pol iticol prisoners. 
In a statement on 15 May, the publishers, Hasta Mitro, 
said that in October lost year, the Attorney-General's 
Office asked them by letter not to distribute the two 
books unt i 1 clearance had been given. Host a Mitra 
refused to comply because "book publications .•. are not 
subject to pre-censorship but to censorship after 
publication." The Attorney-General's request "is 
tantamount to pre-censorship and therefore conflicts 
with the existing publishing regulations". 
The ban was based on assessments by top mi Ii tary 
agencies, the Governor of the National Defence Institute, 
the Written Works Assessment Team of the army's security 
command, Kopkomtib, and the Territorial Assistant of 
GUEST COLUMN 
Kopkamtib.[ IC eputusan Jaksa Agung, Kep036/ JA/5/ 1986, 1 
May 1986.) 
Has ta Mitra condemned the Attorney - General's "biased 
and unfair attitude" towards Pramoedya, and said that 
decisions involving a writer "should be made only on the 
basis of his works as a writer and should not be 
prejudiced by his background as someone who was once a 
political detainee." 
First editions sold out 
Tempo (Jl May) reports that although neither of the 
books was reviewed in the Indonesian press nor 
advertised until early May, the first editions of 10,000 
were sold out and second editions were ready for sale. 
The publishers were not notified of the ban till 14 May. 
Both books have also been pub! ished in their original 
Indonesian by a Malaysian publisher, Wira Karya, working 
in collaboration with Hasta Mitra. Tempo also reports 
that Has to Mitra is in the process of preparing two more 
books by Pramoedya for publication, Gadis Pantai (Girl of 
the Coast) and Rumah /Caca (Glasshouse). 
Pramoedya told Tempo that regardless of the ban, he 
will continue to write. He is preparing a dictionary of 
Indonesian geography with an estimated 80,000 entries, of 
which some 10 per cent are now ready. He is also 
collecting documents for a book on the polemic during 
the 1930s about 'co-operation' and 'non-cooperation' with 
the Dutch colonial regime. 
• The 'missing link' emerges ag,a ~_::.':-:."---.-~1 
In a recent interview with the Dutch journalist, Rene de 
Bok [ Elsevier'sMagazine, 14 June1 retired General Abdul 
Haris Nosution said: "All human rights are guaranteed in 
the Constitution but you are not allowed to exercise 
them. Free assembly, press freedom, they have no meaning 
at oil. They are worth nothing more than the paper on 
which they are printed." 
On 7 June, Tempo reported a fresh case of censorship, 
but not directed this time against the work of an ex-
tapol, such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer whose books, banned 
in May, are likely to become classics of Indonesian 
Ii terature and historiography. The new ban concerns the 
Indonesian translation of an outstanding academic work on 
Indonesian politics, The Army and Politics in Indonesia 
by Harold Crouch [Cornell University Press, 1978). 
At the time of the Tempo report, the book had not yet 
been officially banned. However, the publishers, PT 
Pustaka Sinor Harapan, had already received an oral 
warning by Bakin, the central intelligence agency, that 
the book should be withdrawn from circulation. So on JO 
ond J 1 May, advertisements appeared in Sinor Horapon, the 
Protestant daily, requesting bookshops to stop selling 
the book and return the remaining copies to the 
publishers. 
When asked by Tempo whether the book was actually 
banned, the Attorney-General's office replied: "It 
certainly will be banned." Though the authorities claim 
there is no pre-censorship in Indonesia, an oral warning 
by phone from 8 akin turns out to have been enough to 
intimidate the publishers into withdrawing the book. 
Pramoedya's publishers had also received a 'request' not 
to circulate his books six months before getting a formal 
decision. General Nasution is right . The constitutionally 
guaranteed right to publish is pure whitewash. 
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Why was Crouch's book banned? 
Uni ike the books of Pram where the basic reason is not 
the contents but the author, the Crouch book hos been 
proscribed because of its contents, or more precisely, 
the contents of a few pages. From Tempo, we learn that a 
member of parliament named Rusli Deso drew Bakin's 
attention to some paragraphs which might "endanger the 
security of the state". Asked which passages he hod in 
mind, he said: "There ore things discussed that could 
cause people to lose confidence in President Suharto." 
What worried him in particular was a section under the 
sub-title 'General Suharto' where the author discusses 
the suspicion that Suharto might hove been imp) icoted in 
the 30 September 1965 Movement. Rusli admitted that 
Crouch coiled the suggestion rather "speculative". Yet 
even a serious attempt to treat the issue is evidently 
seen by the authorities as a menace to state security. 
If we toke a look at the paragraphs in question [pages 
123-125 of the English edition1 everything becomes 
clear. In scholarly and cautious fashion, Crouch 
discusses an article of mine published il"I 1970, "Suharto 
and the Untung Coup - The Missing Link" [Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, Vol. 1 ]. where I drew at tent ion to 
two striking facts: that Suharto was not on the I ist of 
generals who were kidnapped on 30 September, and that 
the headquarters of KOSTRAD [the Army Strategic 
Command] which was under Suharto's command, were not 
occupied or surrounded by the troops of the plotters 
although they were located on the some Merdeko Square as 
the president's palace, the telecommunications building 
and the radio stat ion. Al I these were occupied or 
surrounded. 
However,the strongest indication of Suharto's 
implication in the coup - in my argument, the 'missing 
link' - was Suharto's confession in on interview with on 
American journalist that he had met Colonel Lotief, one 
of the chief plotters, in the Jakarta m ilitory hospital 
just a few hours before the noctural kidnapping 
operation was I aunched. 
In a footnote on page 125, Crouch points out that, 
ofter the publication of my 'missing link' article, 
Suharto started to distort his story about what happened 
on the night of 30 September-1 October, 1965. He then 
told foreign diplomats that his name hod been on the list 
of generals to be abducted but the plotters were not sure 
of his whereabouts. This is not true, since Latief hod 
met him late that evening in the hospital. After the 
meeting, Suharto had gone straight home. Moreover, in the 
first edition of Roeder's biography of Suharto published 
in 1969, it was clearly stated that Suharto was not on 
the list. 
By outlawing Crouch's book, the Indonesian authorities 
have shown just how afraid they are of any doubts being 
expressed in history books about Suharto's integrity, a 
fear that I ies at the root of all the recent fury in 
Jakarta over the Australian newspaper article detailing 
corruption by the Suharto family. As it is, Crouch 
regarded my suggestion about Suharto's involvement in 
the plot as 'speculative'. Maybe he would have 
considered it less so had he been aware, before his book 
appeared, of what emerged during the trial of Colonel 
Latief, held in the year his book was published. 
In his testimony, Latief said that when he visited 
Suharto at the military hospital where the general's son 
was being treated for serious scolds, he told Suharto of 
their plans for that night. The new evidence proving 
that Suharto at least had foreknowledge of the conspiracy 
was analysed in another article of mine, "Whose Plot? New 
Light on the 1965 Events" [ Journal of Contemporary Asia, 
Vol. 9, 1979]. 
Bon number four 
This hos now been revealed in a Dutch book entitled 
Jndonesie: De Woarheid omtrent 1965 - Suharto stoat 
terecht [Indonesia: The Truth about 1965, Suharto on 
Trial]. A copy of this book was presented to the 
chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Dutch Porl ioment in November lost year. 
Along with my article, the book contains the Dutch 
translation of Peter Dole Scott's article, "The United 
States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967", the 
original of which appeared in Pacific Affairs [Vol. 58, 
Summer 1985]. Written by a former Canadian diplomat, 
this article provides fresh evidence, mostly token from 
recently declassified documents on US foreign policy, 
about American involvement in the preparations of the 
military takeover in Indonesia in 1965. Dale Scott's 
article corroborates the suspicions that the 1 October 
Musi im book banned 
The Musi im book caught up in the book-banning frenzy 
is Hembangun Strul<tur Hasyaral<at Islam Indonesia 
{Bui Id ing the Structure of an Indonesian Islamic 
Society) by M.S. Sahari, published by the Jakarta 
Institute for Islamic Studies. The book is deemed 
capable of "fanning the emotions of the reader to feel 
animosity towards the government" and "inciting them 
simaltaneously to wage revolution for the creation of a 
new society based on Islamic values in Indonesia". 
Anyone foiling to comply with the Attorney-General's 
ban on possession, circulation or sale of the book will 
be 1 iable to prosecution under the Anti-Subversion Law 
[Kompos, 10 July]. 
events were part of a conspiracy by ant i-Sukorno 
elements in the Indonesian armed forces, in particular 
the intelligence services. 
The Dutch book also contains the almost complete text, 
comprehensively amotated, of the defence plea of Gatot 
Lestorio at his trial in Bl itor in 1975/76. This is a 
courageous document in which Gatot reverses roles, 
becoming not the accused but the accuser of the Suharto 
regime. [See also TAPOL Bulletin, No. 71, September 
1985] It was made public just a few months ofter Gatot's 
execution, on event which caused outrage in many ports of 
the world. 
The latest news is that this book too hos been banned 
by the Indonesian authorities. Since there is no 
Indonesian translation, it seems that the ban simply 
refers to circulation in Indonesia of the Dutch-language 
edition. This is a ban that will surprise no-one. But it 
is a mark of distinction, a much greater distinction than 
the medal conferred on Mrs Eegje Schoo, Dutch Minister of 
Development Cooperation, by the Suharto regime, in 
appreciation of her services as chairperson of the IGGI. 
W.F. Wertheim 
STOP PRESS 
Catholic priest beaten up in East Timor 
Parish priest Fr Walter van Wouwe SOB of Lospolos-Loutem 
was brutally beaten by two Indonesian soldiers on 27 
June, provoking the Catholic Church in East Timor to 
initiate a boycott of government-run Pancasilo 
indoctrination courses. The boycott, said Mgr Belo, 
head of the East Ti mor Church, in a letter to the 
Indonesian authorities, is a "strongly felt protest 
against the brutal and inhuman behaviour that continues 
to occur, and which belittles our pastors". 
A copy of Mgr Belo's letter reached Melbourne and was 
made public by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid. 
AFCOA also made public reports from Oil i of mass 
arrests jus~ ~rior to ev~nts marking the 10th anniversary 
of Indonesia s annexation of East Timor. A letter from 
Di Ii dated l 7 Ju I y reported 80 arrests in Baucau, and 
lc : ge but unknown numbers in Lospalos, Viqueque and Dili. 
Pat Walsh of ACFOA said Mgr Belo's action reveals that 
relations between the army and the Church remain tense. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Harry M. Scobie and Laurie S. Wiseman (editors), Access 
To Justice Zed Press 1985, pp 208. 
Access To Justice is the product of an important and 
unusual meeting in February 1982, a workshop attended by 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from ASEAN 
countries concerned to promote human rights in their 
region. The workshop was held at the initiative of the 
US Human Rights Internet to answer a pressing need: the 
discussion and, it was hoped, the creation of a regional 
mechanism for the protection of human rights in the 
ASEAN region. The outcome was the foundation of the 
Regional Council on Human Rights in Asia by NGOs from 
four ASEAN countries. A representative for the fifth 
member, Singapore, could not be found, such is the 
nature of Lee Kuan Yew's authoritarian rule there. 
The book is a compilation of essays presented to the 
workshop by some of the delegates. As such, it is not a 
comprehensive analysis of repressive practices by ASE AN 
governments, and the writers draw only cautious and 
generalised conclusions about abuses of human rights in 
the region. Nor do they try to provide o radical approach 
to the promotion of human rights. They use existing 
principles and examples, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and es tab I ished juridical and 
const itut ionol practice in western nations, as their 
points of reference. 
The universality of human rights principles 
The writers make the important point that just because 
international standards for individual justice ore 
largely western in origin, it does not mean that they ore 
neither appropriate nor just in Asian societies, a claim 
often made by South East Asian regimes to justify their 
repressive policies. Indeed, oil the writers work on the 
assumption that existing international standards are 
rooted in general human experience, and are not just the 
product of a particular society or culture. The writers 
are convincing because they can show, with their detailed 
knowledge of cases in their own countries, that systems 
claiming to be 'just' and 'fair' in on 'Asian' way ore in 
fact arbitrary, and weighted against the protection of 
the individual, often in seemingly small and 
inconspicuous ways. 
Mulya Lubis from Indonesia, for example, cites a 
clause in Indonesia's recent procedural code that allows 
legal advisors to observe but not be present at 
interrogations. He describes how many interrogation 
rooms are partitioned off by glass, so that lawyers can 
see but not hear the proceedings, thus preventing them 
from advising and protecting a client at a crucial time. 
If there is a common thread running through the essays, 
it is a preoccupation with legal and constitutional 
procedures in AS EAN countries. Other human rights 
issues, like access to political power and to a fair 
share of national resources, are referred to but not 
discussed in detail. Many of the writers are practising 
lawyers, and oil of them seek to take action within the 
existing political and economic systems, to protect 
human rights. 
Fighting for the proper implementation of current laws 
and criticising unjust ones is a most effective means for 
NGOs to uphold individual rights without themselves 
being repressed. 
The great weakness of human rights promotion within a 
legal framework is that it is effective only insofar as 
the governments wish to appear to be acting legally. The 
Indonesian regime has made only the feeblest attempts at 
legal justification of its brutal military operations in 
East Timor and West Papua, which have been conducted 
with a horrific disregard for international laws and 
principles. Instead, the regime relies on secrecy and a 
strict ban on domestic reporting, to prevent condemnation 
Harry M. Scoble & Laurie S. Wiseber 
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of its policies in these two territories. It is no 
surprise that neither of these cases is dealt with, or 
even mentioned, by the Indonesian writers. Likewise, 
m ii itary repression of rural communities by the 
Philippine Armed Forces leaves little scope for legal 
defence of any kind. 
The need for structural change 
All the writers recognise these limitations and they 
expand the debate on human rights to encompass other 
rights - the right to development, to freedom from 
poverty. At the same time, they acknowledge that there 
is a need for major structural changes, in which they 
have an important role to play. But they stop short of 
defining what their role in such change might be. 
Their attacks on ASEAN governments are particularly 
important at the moment as those governments try to 
present a 'legal' and 'liberal' face to the rest of the 
world which often seems content to accept the pretence 
at face value. By detailing amendments to constitutions 
and special provisions enabling governments to suspend 
constitutional rights, by attacking draconian laws like 
Indonesia's Anti-Subversion Law, Malaysia's Internal 
Security Act and Thailand's laws invoking Lese Majeste, 
the writers show the so-coiled rule of law in ASE AN 
countries to be a cover-up for systematic abuses of 
human rights in the name of the state. 
Access To Justice is not always approachable, and it 
lacks coherence because the editors hove reproduced the 
essays as they were presented. But it marks the 
beginning of more coordinated action by NGOs in ASE AN to 
protect individuals in their countries from the actions 
of the state. The individual essays are original and go 
to the roots of the principles of human rights. The most 
valuable thing for activists from western countries 
working on this region is that this book provides a wide 
range of ideas and observations from people who hove a 
unique familiarity with the difficulties of defending 
human rights inside the ASEAN countries. 
Jere m IJ Smithers. 
The Ecologist 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
·More verdicts 
and new trials 
• • • 
The saga of Muslim trials continues relentlessly, with some already convicted men being charged for a second time, and 
new groups of 'subversives' emerging to justify a new wave of trials. There is little doubt these trials will continue up 
to and beyond the general elections in April 1987. 
Preacher gets seven years 
A lay preacher, Abdul Lotief bin Amir, 43, a furniture 
dealer by trade, was sentenced to seven years for a 
sermon he delivered last year on ldul Fitri, the 
festival at the end of Ramodhan. The charge complained 
that he accused government officials of being hypocrites 
and feigning Islamic beliefs, and that he enticed his 
audience to join "a banned organisation" the so-called 
Islamic Indonesian State (Negara Islam Indonesia). The 
charge alleged that such talk, at a time when the state 
is involved in a programme of development, could incite 
people to stop complying with government policies. 
Found guilty under the Anti-Subversion Law, the court 
said he could be sentenced without regard for whether his 
sermon had had a negative social impact, but that it 
could hove had such an impact [Jakarta Post, 5 June]. 
Abdul Lotief first came to public attention in June 
1985 when Major-General Try Sutrisno, then Jakarta 
Mil itaryCommander(now Army Chief-of-Staff), announced 
that "stern measures" would be taken against him and 
another lay preacher for anti-government sermons during 
Idul Fitri. The other preacher was Syafruddin 
Prawiranegara, chair of the Indonesian Corps of 
Mubalighs. [For a report of Syafruddin's sermon, see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 70, September 1985.] Syafruddin, a 
well - known politician and one-time Prime Minister, was 
interrogated at length at the time, but the army 
apparently decided against taking the risk of prosecuting 
him in court. 
After sentence was announced, Abdul Latief said he 
would not appeal but would ask the president for clemency 
[Kompos, 5 June]. 
Tonjung Priok preacher arrested 
Syarifin Maloko, a preacher who is said to have been 
in hiding since he delivered a sermon on the evening of 
12 September, 1984 in Tanjung Priok, just prior to the 
demonstration which was fired on by troops, leaving many 
people dead, hos been arrested in West Java. 
According to official reports, Maloko was living under 
an assumed name, and had gained the confidence of a 
local congregation, winning popularity for his sermons. 
However, a local army intelligence officer recognised 
his voice with the help of a tape of his Tanjung Priok 
sermon. 
The report of how he was arrested makes it clear that 
military intelligence continue with their practice of 
spying on preachers. [Tempo, 5 July] 
Recent verdicts and trials 
In Probolinggo, East Java, Lufthi Ali, 44, is on trial 
for subversion. He is described as the head of a local 
Islamic Crash Course (LP3K) and leader of lkwanul 
Muslimin, an organisation said to include already 
convicted men such as Moh. Achwan and Simpuang Abdul 
Malik. Its alleged objective is the formation of an 
Islamic Indonesian state. The defendant is also alleged 
to be involved in the plot to assassinate President 
Suharto. (See separate item on the Sanusi trial.) 
A man found guilty of involvement in the Malang 
bombing incidents, Abdul KadirBaraja(see TAPOL Bulletin 
No 75, May 1986), had his 13-year sentence raised to 15 
years, on appeal by the prosecution [Surabaya Pos, 24 
June]. 
Achmad Muladawila, 25, already convicted and given a 
20-year sentence, is to go on trial again, this time for 
possessing videotapes of Ayatollah Khomeini speeches 
L Kompas, 13 June]. 
Erlangga, a student charged for being the moderator at 
a meeting on 18 September 1984 which allegedly instigated 
the October 1984 bombings, was sentenced to six years on 
25 July. 
New wave of trials commences in Central Java 
A new series of trials commenced in Central Java in 
June, after the reported arrest of 16 men, following the 
monitoring of various groups. They are said to be part of 
'Usroh', seen by the authorities as the latest 
incarnation of the local struggle to set up an Islamic 
state. The first two to come on trial have so far been 
identified only by their initials, W alias MS and MS 
[Kompos, 23 June and Suara Merdeka, 24 June]. 
Surveillance of ldul Fitri sermons 
The hounding of Abdul Latief and Syafruddin draws 
attention to the army's practice of monitoring 
sermons, particularly on special occasions like ldul 
F itri which marks the end of Romadhan. In addition, 
the authorities ban preachers whom they dis I Ike. 
However, in order to give the impression that no-
one is actually banned, they control preachers by the 
device of preparing a list of those who are allowed 
to preach! 
Shortly before ldul Fitri this year, it was 
announced that preachers were required to obtain 
permission to speak on ldul Fitri. So far, it was 
said, 156 had been positively vetted. Permits are 
issued by local religious affairs offices, but the 
names must be confirmed by the security agencies 
before being submitted to these offices. An official 
of the Jakarta Dewan Dakwoh (Missionary Council) 
claimed that people are not banned or screened. It is 
simply that "organisers of ldul Fitri prayer meetings 
know who is allowed and who is not allowed to give 
sermons". 
Among those who ore kept off the I ist, said one 
Jakarta municipality official, are members of the 
Petition of 50 group. [Jakarta Post, 6 June] 
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Sanusi goes on trial again 
"It would seem I'm the godfather to every disturbance in Indonesia," said Ir H.M. Sanusi, as his second trial got under 
way. The 65-year old businessman and former minister is already serving a 19-year sentence for financing the 1984 B CA 
bombings, despite all the evidence to the contrary [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 69, May 1985]. 
Ir Sanusi went on trial for a second time on 8 April, 
charged with subversion for allegedly plotting to 
assassinate the president on at least two occasions, as 
wel I as conspiring to overthrow the government, along 
with the Petition-of-50 Group. 
Many of the 15 or so prosecution witnesses had already 
confessed a role in various plots. One of the two key 
witnesses for the prosecution's case, Nur Imam, a 
vegetable seller, claimed Sanusi gave him Rp 4 million 
to buy explosives to blow up the presidential car in 
Jakarta in July 1982, and said he went to Singapore to 
buy rockets. The other, Marwan Ashuri, a businessman, 
claimed that on hearing Suharto was still alive (!), he 
suggested to Sanusi that they blow up the president at 
the opening of the restored Borobudur Temple in February 
1983. He also said Sanusi gave him a lot of money to 
print invitations for a gathering at Istiqlal Mosque 
after the assassination had been successfully 
implemented. 
Evidence about these various transactions were 
confus·ed and contradictory, while many crucial ·aspects 
of the plots remained vague. Did Nur Imam actually buy 
the rockets? Why were the plots not carried out? Why 
indeed, was nothing ever said at the time of the alleged 
plots, about the president being in such danger? 
Sanusi was scathing about Nur Imam's "interesting 
fables". He told the court the prosecution had used his 
first trial to stereotype him by framing him for 
involvement in the BCA bombings, to support their even 
more preposterous charges of involvement in an 
assass i notion plot. 
Key witness dies in detention 
The Borobudur attack was said to hove been planned by 
Moh. Zabir. However, this witness died while in 
detention, and written testimony from him was presented 
in court posthumously. According to this testimony, 
security at the Temple had been too tight for the 
bombing to take place [Pelita and Kompas, 7 Moy]. 
However, Sanusi later produced a document from Zobir's 
nephew testifying that his uncle, who hod been arrested 
for unknown reasons, was beaten by interrogators who 
were attempting to extract false testimony from him. He 
died early this year, his body covered by wounds and 
bruises. [Jakarta Post, l 1 July] 
A 'Nasabr i' government? 
The prosecution alleged that the object of the 
assossi not ion plot was to set up o new government, to 
iriclude Sanusi, Ali Sadikin and other dissidents. This 
would be a coalition of nationalist, religious and armed 
forces elements, called Nasabri. Some even mentioned the 
late Adam Malik as being a likely 'acting president'. 
Two witnesses whose written testimony hod been widely 
used in earlier trials, appeared in person for the first 
time at Sanusi's trial, by which time they were out of 
prison, under house arrest. [Hardly any detainees are 
given this kind of 'concession'.] Mursalin Dahl on, a 
preacher from Bandung and founder of the Islamic Crash 
Courses many of whose staff ore now serving heavy 
sentences [see TAPOL Bulletif\ No 75, Moy 19861 and Ir 
Sohirul Alim, a science lecturer at Godjah Mada 
University and a highly-regarded Musi im intellectual, 
both testified on Sanusi's role in the assassination 
plot and about his presence at a meeting in Jogjakarta 
Ir H. Sonusi on trial in Jakarta. [Tempo, 12 April] 
in 1982 where the assassination plot was allegedly first 
hatched. 
Under cross - examination, however, serious discrepancies 
emerged about moneys received, in what form and from 
whom, as well os contradictions about their own roles. 
Dohlan said he knew nothing about the plot except for 
something about remote-controlled bombs. Alim however 
said Dahlen knew oil about the plan, and told the court 
(surprisingly!) that Sanusi had nothing to do with it. 
Another prosecution witness named Rany Yunsih, who is 
serving a 7-year sentence for "seditious sermons", 
retracted statements attributed to him in pre-trial 
interrogation. When asked in court what he hod heard Nur 
Imam and Sonusi discuss, he replied tersely, "cabbages" 
[Jakarta Post, 28 Moy]. 
Defence witnesses 
Tashrif Tuosikal, now serving a 17-year sentence, 
denied being involved in any plot with Sanusi. Chris 
Siner Key Timu, a member of the Petition-of-SO group, 
vehemently denied that the Group hod ever contemplated 
overthrowing the government. As for being involved in a 
plot to create on Islamic state, the implication in the 
charges against Sonusi, Chris Siner, o well-known 
Cothol ic intellectual, said that, were there any truth 
at all in such claims, he would hove left the Petition 
Group long ago 
Two other defence witnesses foiled to appear. Ali 
Sadik in was not allowed to testify, the court arguing 
that since he had attended all the trial heari ,ngs, his 
evidence would be "partial". Professor Jsmoi l Suny 
refused to testify. No explanation was given, but he may 
have been embarrassed by Sanusi saying that his views 
about Poncasila were derived from Suny's writings. 
A fifth defence witnesses, Moh Achwon, who is serving a 
I ife sentence. also failed to appear. In his own trial, 
Achwon denied that Sanusi hod said he planned to k i 11 
Suharto. All he said, according to Achwon, was that 
Suharto was "not a very good Muslim". 
Prosecution demands life sentence 
Despite the contradictory nature of evidence presented 
in court, the prosecution persisted in pressing the 
charges and asked the court to give Sonusi a life 
sentence. 
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Where returning home is a crime 
Four 'ex-PKI' members who returned home after spending 
many years d:>road as political exiles have been arrested 
recently in Central Java. The four men, named as Tangis 
Darmono, HansDimyoti,Sambungon Simondjuntak and Tohari, 
are alleged to have "infiltrated" themselves back into 
society, and to have "so cunningly" deceived people as 
to make it difficult to distinguish any more between 
"who is PK I and who isn't". 
The arrests were the subject of a "scientific lecture" 
delivered in July by Major-General Harsoediyono Hartas, 
military commander of Central Java, to on audience of 
faculty members of private universities from all ports of 
Central Java. The lecture, reported at length in the 
Semarang daily, Kedaulatan Rakyat [11 July 19861 is a 
particularly vicious example of the witch-hunting 
fervour of Indonesia's military rulers. Major-General 
Horsoediyono is from the new generation that has taken 
over in the army, who ore showing themselves to be no 
less dogmatic than the 1945 generation. 
"These PK I remnants ore so cunning in their trickery 
and deception that it is sometimes difficult for us to 
distinguish between who is and who isn't PK I. They 
infiltrate and ploy their tricks in oil fields, 
ideological, political, economic and cultural, and even 
military. Take for example Tohori, who managed to slip 
himself in as a student at the Semarang Police Academy. 
It's difficult to tell whether he is extreme right or 
PKI." 
An ocean of suspects 
Major-General Harsoediyono then turned the penetrating 
light of his scientific analysis on the "PKI remnants in 
Central Java who, together with their wives and children, 
amount to some 1.6 mi I I ion people." [This is the figure 
usually given for 'ex-PK!' throughout Indonesia, but who 
cores about a little exaggeration for the sake of science 
and notional vigilance, the two themes that, according to 
Kedouloton Rakyat, inspired the major-general.] 
"These people ore classified as F-Cotegory. Although it 
isn't easy to detect their activities, all their names 
have been registered, because we know oil about their 
style from history. So, if there is any movement, it only 
remains for us to round them up." 
But they are a cunning lot, the military commander 
continued, changing their identity, "even changing their 
identity cards by moving away to Lampung or D jambi, then, 
after getting themse Ives new papers, returning to Java 
with new identities." 
They even use ti me to their advantage. "By behaving 
well [so, good behaviour has become a crime!], the 
community is lulled into forgetting their past 
treacheries, and forgives them. But remember. Once they 
hove been forgiven, new catastrophes will befall us." 
"They throw up all kinds of issues, about the 
presidency, about Mrs Suharto and Pok Harto, and still 
worse, use the dukun (faith-healers) for their own 
purposes. 
"They are so bri 11 iant at creating international 
intellectual cadres that it is difficult to know whether 
they are communists or 1 iberols, whether they are 
Pancosiloists or fundamentalists. Indeed, eventually 
communism and liberalism will merge, giving birth to a 
new fundamentalism. This is very dangerous indeed." 
To round off his talk, Harsoediyono Hartas dealt in 
detai 1 with the 'crimes' of the four arrested men. Hans 
Dimyati hod learnt seven languages during his exile, and 
had become an expert in "military affairs, chemistry and 
food''. He was at school in Moscow and attended a military 
academy in Nanking. Sambungon Simondjuntak was well 
trained, getting military education in Albania, Burma and 
China and his return to Indonesia was arranged through 
Hongkong. Tangis Dar mono got back Into Indonesia through 
Cambodia ofter attending mil i tory lectures in Vietnam; he 
graduated from school in Moscow. 
Search as we might through this rather lengthy news 
story, however, them i litary commander had nothing to soy 
about any laws they violated since their ret~rn to 
Indonesia. We must conclude, therefore, that their only 
crime was to have returned home. 
Thousands of 'PKI teachers' forced into 
early retirement 
"Thousands" of teachers who were "involved in the 
GJOS/PK I affair" (of 1965) have been discovered, still 
working as teachers in Central Java. The more elderly 
(over 50) among them will be forced into early 
retirement, while the younger ones will be dismissed. 
There are, according to various provincial authorities, 
altogether 2,832 'ex-PKI' still functioning as primary 
school teachers, school-caretakers and office workers at 
the provincial Education Office. "They must be watched 
and their movements restricted," said Ismail, the 
governor of Central Java. The military commander said it 
is wrong "to toke the risk of letting them cling to their 
jobs for ever". 
But, "we should be humane towards them, and let them 
enjoy their pensions. Otherwise, they might be completely 
alienated (terkucil)". [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 29 May] 
900 railwaymen to be dismissed 
As a result of the recent screening of the 11,000 
employees of the rai lwoy network in Central Java, nine 
hundred 'ex-PK I' people hove been discovered, and will be 
dismissed. One railway official said the extent of their 
'PK I involvement' was not yet clear, as this was a matter 
for the military command to determine. But since they 
were mostly quite advanced in age and had been working 
for the railway for many years, it was not expected that 
their dismissal would cause any unrest. 
The mass screening was apparently prompted by several 
rail accidents in the past few months. Naturally, hints 
of 'PK I sabotage' were dropped though no-one hos been 
able to substantiate anything. 
An assistant at the governor's office said no-one 
employed by the provincial administration could escape 
screening. From the time anyone applies for a job, they 
are thoroughly investigated. He felt confident 'ex-PK I' 
dismissals would go on without stop because of the tough 
screening methods used [Kedoulatan Rakyat, 21 May]. 
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Transilligration prograillille under attack 
The Indonesian Government is mounting strong rear-guard 
action to defend its controversial transmigration 
programme against foreign and domestic criticism. 
Government officials are particularly concerned that 
international environmental and human rights 
organisations are pressing the World Bank to withdraw 
funding from "the biggest colonisation programme in 
history", which has oppressed ethnic groups and caused 
serious ecological damage in many of Indonesia's 'outer' 
islands. 
Jakarta hos cause to worry, since the charges levelled 
are the same as criticisms of Brazil, the only other 
country with a combination of large tracts of forest, a 
transmigration programme and a shocking human rights 
record. As a result of similar protests, the US 
Government, the biggest single donor to the World Bank, 
insisted that $256 million be withheld from Brazil 
because of the detrimental effects of the Amazon highway 
on local Indian tribes and their rainforest. And last 
December, the US Congress ruled that US directors of the 
World Bank and other agencies should only support 
environmentally beneficial projects, and ensure that 
indigenous people are not harmed. 
The critical role of foreign funding 
External funding is crucial for transmigration. It 
costs about $7,000 to relocate each family, in a country 
where the average annual income per capita is less than 
$600. The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 
which includes the World Bank, had provided about $800 
million by mid-1985. In other words, about one-third of 
transmigration costs have been borne by foreign loans and 
international aid. 
The Indonesian economy has been hard hit by the fall 
in world oi I prices and the recession in commodity 
markets over the past year. In the recent stringent 
budget, government spending on transmigration was slashed 
by 44 per cent, and further cuts have been announced 
more recently. This July, Transmigration Minister, 
Martono said that during the 1986/87 budget period, 
transmigration efforts are to be limited to those 
receiving assistance from foreign governments. In other 
words, foreign funding, long integral to the programme 
hos now become its mainstay. 
Transmigration is too important to Jakarta for the 
government tow ind down its operations of its own accord. 
Quite apart from the numbers of mi Ii tary personne I and 
government officials who make a tidy profit from 
transmigration construction projects, the government has 
promoted transmigration as a matter of national pride and 
the cornerstone in its development plans. 
In response to recent criticisms from Friends of the 
Earth, Survival International and TAPOL, the Minister of 
Transmigration, Mortono, has taken every opportunity to 
'clarify' the issues by explaining Indonesia's policies. 
This invariably consists of well-worn statistics about 
the success of the programme, an outline of its aims and 
the importance of national development for a rapidly 
growing population. Foreigners who refuse to accept these 
'explanations' are accused of wilfully misinterpreting 
the evidence for political reasons. 
Martono denies that transmigration is responsible for 
large- scale deforestation, and puts the blame on 
shifting cultivators. But three months after a press 
conference in Washington at which Marcus Colchester of 
Survival International launched the special issue of The 
Ecologist, there has still been no attempt to provide 
evidence which refutes the charges laid on the doorstep 
f 
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Marcus Colchester, Survival International, and Charles 
Secrett (squatting), Friends of the Earth, demonstrating 
at this year's IGGI meeting. [Photo: Jan Muter] 
of the regime. Indeed, some government statements 
confirm the criticisms. 
Listed among the aims of the programme, but not • 
promoted so publicly, are its social and military 
functions. Transmigration provides a ray of hope for the 
mi 11 ions of landless poor in Java and Bali who ore a 
potential source of unrest. Transmigration officials in 
Banyumas, East Java, are delighted that sixty workers 
made redundant by a local factory have signed up for re-
settlement; as they were given no redundancy pay, and 
wages are too low for them to save anything, they had 
Ii t t I e choice. 
Similarly for thousands of people in Central and West 
Java who were unfortunate enough to live in places 
destined for re-forestation, hydro-electric projects or 
other developments, plus those made homeless by natural 
disasters, transmigration is the only option. Even the 
crackdown on becak drivers and vagrants in Jakarta is 
acclaimed in newspapers in terms of another handful of 
urban poor who are opting for the new 1 ife. These are 
hardly the skilled farmers which officials claim are 
picked for transmigration schemes. 
Frontier buffer zones 
Transmigrants are being used to create buffer zones 
along politically sensitive borders in New Guinea and 
Kalimantan. For example, there have been official pleas 
in West Ka limantan for 'voluntary transm igrants' to 
settle along the border with Eastern Malaysia where 
houses and land stand empty, deserted by their former 
occupants. Yet, elsewhere in the province, nearly 20,000 
'normal' transmi.grant families are still awaiting their 
statutory allocation of agricultural land. 
In July, President Suharto said the military should 
supply the Transmigration Ministry with river vessels to 
help move settlers into "inaccessible regions". One 
wonders how these people wi 11 get the supplies and 
agricultural extension services they require in such 
remote places, and how they are expected to market any 
produce. 
Since the hard-hitting attack by The Ecologist and 
Survival lnternational's press conference in Washington, 
the government hos been trying to cover up these failures 
and clean up its act before the next World Bank meeting 
in October ·of this year. In May, Martono told reporters 
in Jakarta that the numbers of dissatisfied transmigrants 
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leaving their projects was not an indication of failure, 
but an acceptable risk with any large programme. In his 
view, this only represents a small fraction of total 
sett 1 ers, who ore not "mentally prepared" (ti dak si ap 
mental). This ploy of attacking the victims of the 
regime's own incompetence is a familiar one to Bulletin 
readers. Time and again, speeches by government officials 
point out that transmigronts should show more initiative 
and not simply wait for state aid, even when they were 
lured into transmigration and away from Java and Bali by 
transmigration officers, making promises of golden 
opportunities. 
Remarkably, the Transmigration Minister announced that 
the President has banned transmigration officials from 
soliciting or accepting commissions from projects. "If 
government representatives indulge in normal business 
practices," he said, "the quality of development and 
levels of morale will suffer." The President's own 
dealings, revealed in the Australian press earlier this 
year, are presumably excluded from these exhortations. 
No more PKI tronsmigronts, please! 
The Transmigration Minister has warned that the 
transmigration of ex-PK I people must stop. He also 
said that regional mi 1 itary commanders and the Armed 
Forces commander in chief must give "guidance" to 
those ex-PK I who have already managed to get 
themselves re-settled. [Pedomon Rakyat, 25 May] 
Meanwhile, from Bengkulu in Sumatra comes a report 
that there are one thousand "members of banned 
organisations" [ie. PK I] who ore a matter of concern 
(sedang diperm asalahkan} among the 22,360 families 
that have transmigrated into the region from Java. 
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Plantation labour 
Meanwhile ministers responsible for transm igrotion 
face an uphlll struggle to save face while introducing 
drastic financial cuts in the programme. Since May, th~y 
no longer talk about fulfilling targets, and it ts 
becoming increasingly difficult to find accurate, 
comprehensive figures in newspaper reports. The keynote 
now is the quality of the projects, not the quantity of 
settlers. No new sites ore to be established, apart from 
those already covered by foreign loans. The emphasis will 
be on improving existing projects and encouraging private 
investment. 
One way to bring in private capitol is by linking the 
scheme to the government's plantation project (PIRSUS} 
where the plantation compCJ"ly bears some of the costs of 
setting up new plantations for palm oil, cocoa, rubber 
and sugar. The company owns the 'core plot' where 
tronsmigronts wil 1 work. The lotter wil 1 hove land 
rights in 'peripheral plots' which, it seems, they will 
be expected to work in their free time, under the some 
conditions as settlers in ordinary transmigration sites. 
The plantation programme hos had its own financial 
problems in the past, and this scheme smacks of the 
indentured labour schemes imposed by the Dutch colonial 
regime, prior to independence. 
The government is also trying to ease the financial 
burden by encourog ing independent transm I grants, those 
who resettle on government-supplied land without 
government support. So far, the numbers responding ore 
much lower than was hoped. Even when land and housing 
have been offered to these 'voluntary m igronts, they are 
staying put. Provincial officials in places where 
thousands of dollars have been spent on clearing land and 
building facilities may be left with on expensive white 
elephant. 
Javanese trcrismigrants setting out for their new home on 
an outer island. [Photo: Jerome R icordou] 
Inv i totions that have not materialised 
In his first few responses to the Survival press 
conference in May, Martone sold Survival would be 
welcome to send observers to see the programme, and even 
said he would invite them to do so. Loter, it was said, 
Environment Minister, Emil Salim would do the inviting. 
But Survival has heard nothing yet. Presumably, the 
authorities have not yet decided whether it is worth 
taking such a risk. They would wont to be sure of who 
turns up, and of getting people who would accept 
government escorts as they make their 'independent' 
observations. 
Now that some of the facts about transmigration hove 
been brought out into the open, the outhori ties ore 
showing almost as much sensitivity about al lowing 
foreigners to visit projects as they ore about allowing 
independent investigation of conditions in West Papua and 
East Timor. 
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Prison camps for refugees 
Papua New Guinea Governmentplans to transfer several hundred West Papuan refugees to a prison ca mp have been revealed in 
a confidential government report. Australian journalist, Robin Osborne reports: 
PNG 
-*"Nomad 
, 
' 
Wabo * 
The Papua New Guinea government is giving serious 
thought to relocating up to 400 Irion Joyan refugees 
from the village huts they have inhabited for over two 
years to a prison camp where families would live in 
dormitory compounds inside security fences and be 
supervised from watchtowers, topped by floodlights. 
The plan, which would cost around £400,000, is 
described in detail in a confidential report prepared by 
Trevor Downes, a former Australian patrol officer, now a 
senior official with PNG 's Provincial Affairs 
Department, which administers refugee affairs. 
The proposed camp, at a site named Wabo on the banks of 
the Purari River in Gulf Province, has for decades been 
a controversial place. At the time of independence, the 
government of Michael Somare intended to make it the 
centre of the planned Purari hydro scheme, selling power 
to Australia via a submarine cable to Darwin. For 
environmental and economic reasons, the scheme was 
scrapped. 
In 1979, Wabo workers' barracks were refurbished by 
thePNGgovemment andthe UNHCR to help accommodate the 
increasing number of border-crossers from Indonesia. 
About 150 men, women and children lived, unhappily, in 
Wabo until April 1981 when, with the exception of four 
'security cases', including E.J. Boney, former governor 
of Irion Jayo who was given asylum in Sweden, they were 
allowed to resettle permanently in PNG. 
An "undesirable" place 
When Wabo was closed, the UNHCR 's representative in 
PNG, Tom Unwin, said: "The UN welcomes the closure of 
this expensive and undesirable place." Five years later, 
with another, larger influx of refugees to cope with, 
PNG seems about to make history repeat itself. The cost, 
in both human and monetary terms, is likely to be high. 
PNG's plans to move the 10,000 refugees away from the 
sensitive border region was made public in Morch and was 
not denied by the new coalition government of Prime 
Minister Paias Wingti. The theory is to separate the 
majority of border-crossers from OPM activists who are 
supposedly preventing their return. 
PNG hope to evacuate the 15 camps along the border and 
relocate the residents at places matching their security 
classification. The majority, known in official parlance 
as 'simple villagers' or 'non-politicals', are due to be 
moved to a 600 sq km jungle expanse in Western Province, 
near the appropriately named site of Nomad. There, it is 
hoped, they will provide plantation labour to tap rubber 
trees. 
The refugees may be reluctant to move to Nomad since 
malnutrition there is 50 per cent above the national 
average, malaria is endemic, and respiratory, gastric 
and dental problems {the last caused by the high mineral 
content of the water) ore rife. Annual rainfalls average 
1,200 millimetres, compounding the health risks. 
Nomad, however, sounds a positive delight compared with 
Wabo camp, whose isolation, Trevor Downes notes in his 
report, makes it suitable for accommodating "hard-core 
political refugees". Downes inspected Wubo in late 
January in the company of PNG officials and a UNHCR 
official. 
He concluded that Wabo's airstrip was in good condition 
and that the buildings were fair though needed some 
repair. However, "Wabo in its present configuration would 
not seem suitable for accommodation of a large number of 
family groups. Right now, it could accommodate about 25 
or 30 families without a great expenditure." 
The department described Wabo as a CIS (Corrective 
Institutions Service) facility, i.e. a prison. The CIS 
considered making Wabo a high-security prison in 1984 
when jail breaks in PNG became a major problem, and 
Downes did not suggest that refugees should be handled 
differently from prisoners. 
Downes gave Port Moresby a detailed renovation plan 
whereby Wabo would comprise 12 dormitories capable of 
holding 96 "detainees" each. In Blackwater camp, each 
refugee family 1 i ves in its own house, made of bush 
materials. In Wabo, they would sleep in rows of bunks 
divided by screens, sharing two "water borne WCs and 
four showers" among 96 people. There would be one large 
ablution block for each dormitory, with 12 WCs and 
showers. 
Although there is nowhere to escape to from this remote 
spot, inmates would be surrounded by a "standard height 
2.4 metre security fence around each set of four 
dormitories ..• forming a compound". Perimeter fencing 
around each compound would be a "3.65 metre high 'Y'-type 
fence, with a 6 metre wide 'clearway' between perimeter 
and compound security fence ". 
Watchtowers and floodlights 
Wabo residents, mostly educated people from Jayapura 
who did not engage in violent opposition to Indonesian 
rule, would be overseen by nine watchtowers, 4.2 metres 
tall, equipped with swivel-type floodlights. The towers 
would be roofed, so they would presumably be manned by 
CIS guards. 
A UNHCR official in Port Moresby observed recently that 
while Wabo was not envisaged for permanent resettlement 
{he agreed it was "not ideal" for the purpose), PNG 
considered it a temporary holding area for up to three 
or four years. 
During this time, he reported, it was hoped that 
refugees would repatriate or that more suitable land 
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would be found for sett.lement. However, he said that 
officials hod "stressed the difficulty of land 
acquisition". 
The Premier of Gulf Province also opposes Wabo's long-
term use, saying it should be a holding centre only 
pending the finding of o third country for permanent 
settlement. But, as Downes asked in his report: "Is the 
finding of o third country o realistic possibility?'' 
The UNHCR official said "high profile" OPM and their 
families to be moved to Wobo could number 300 to 400 
people (half Blackwater camp's population). He added 
that the advance guard of 25 to 30 fom ilies would help 
renovate the comps. Downes however conceded that the 
city people might be "reluctant and possibly locking in 
skills to build houses". 
The UNHCR said Wobo's problems included rainfall 
which, as at Nomad, is very high, the terrain, which is 
very hard to cultivate, and transport costs would could 
be "exorbitant". 
Pre-empting the screening process 
In January, when PNG announced it would sign the UN 
Convention on Refugees, it promised that all border-
crossers would be interviewed in the comps before any 
move took place. Now the government hos dropped 
screening until comp dwe.llers con be moved away from the 
border. While this will please Indonesia which believes 
the refugees give some of their food aid to the OPM, it 
hos not impressed people working in the comps. One of 
them commented: "The stigma of being moved to Wobo, to 
be known as a place for the 'hardcore' politicols, means 
that none of these people could ever safely return to 
Indonesia even if they wonted to. If the plan goes 
ahead, the screening process w i II hove been pre-empted." 
The Australian Refugee Council said that using Wobo in 
this way would re-create closed comps such as in Thailand 
and Hongkong. "Experience elsewhere suggests this would 
turn the refugees into captives and create a volotJle 
situation." The Council said PNG would be well advised to 
abandon Wobo. "Here is o chance for PNG to show a humane 
example in refugee administration". 
Deported refugee describes torture in Indonesia 
Aben Pogowok, one of the twelve West Popuon refugees who 
were forcibly deported to Jayapura lost October, hos 
again succeeded in fleeing from Indonesian control and 
hos returned to Papua New Guinea. After spending two 
months in o PNG jail for "illegal entry", he hos now 
been released and hos been granted refugee status. 
Torture and maltreatment 
Interviewed by Bishop John Etheridge soon ofter he 
returned to Vonimo in Moy, Pogowok described how oil the 
twelve deported men were immediately arrested on their 
return to Jayapura, and held in over-crowded, insanitary 
pol ice eel Is. They were subjected to beatings with 
rubber truncheons and electric shock. 
He said that he and five others (according to another 
report, four others) were released by the Indonesian 
security forces earlier this year on the understanding 
that they would spy on the OPM. Of the others released 
with him, he says, one is missing and another is now 
blind in his left eye. The other deportees ore still in 
joi I and hove apparent I y been tried, though reliable 
information about these trials is not available. 
Two days ofter he reached PNG soi 1, Pogowok was 
arrested and charged with illegal entry. The court told 
him to return to Indonesia or face up to two months in 
prison. This led to fears that he might again be 
deported. To prevent this happening, Bishop Etheridge 
mode pub I ic the facts about Pogowok and warned that any 
attempt to deport him again would cause widespread 
unrest among the refugees. "They are grateful to be in o 
sof e country, but for two years, they hove wo i ted in 
what is I ittle more than o staging comp ..• They wont to 
get on with their own I ives, and that is not possible 
with the threat of repatriation hanging over them." 
The lawyer Bernard Narokobi appealed against the court 
verdict, and secured on acquittal plus the protection of 
refugee status. Pogowok is now bock in Blackwater 
refugee comp. 
[The Catholic Leade£, Brisbone 28 Moy, and Times of PNG, 
18 July, 1986.] 
**** Two West Papuans granted refugee status in Australia 
Two of the eleven West Popuons who mode their way from 
Merouke to Austral ion islands in the Torres Straits lost 
year, hove now been granted refugee status. However, 
Canberra is still unwilling to grant them permanent 
residence in Australia and hos granted them Temporary 
Entry Permits which ore subject to review every six 
months, saying it would prefer them to find asylum in 
another country. 
The nine who hove not been granted refugee status will 
also get Temporary Entry Permits. This means they con 
travel anywhere in the country and seek employment. 
Imm igrotion Minister, Christopher Hurd said the two 
were able to produce "convincing evidence" of political 
activity in Irion Joyo while the others were not [Weekend 
Australian, 28-29 June]. This reluctant move on 
Australia's port is apparently intended to prevent other 
West Popuons concluding that Australia is o likely haven 
for people fleeing from Indonesian terror. 
Ghana tokes in OPM leaders 
Meanwhile, five OPM leaders who left the bush lost 
year and surrendered in PNG hove been given temporary 
asylum in Ghana. The five ore Jomes Nyoro, Alex Oerey, 
Gerardus Thorny, Ries Wader and David Timko. The UN High 
Commission for Refugees is trying to find permanent 
asylum for them in Scandinavia [Sydney Morning Herold, 25 
June]. There ore already several West Popuon refugees in 
Sweden, including OPM leader Jacob Proi. 
According to Peter Hastings, President Suharto finds 
"the notion of refugees so embarrassing that he would 
never accept on invitation to visit Sweden (because) it 
hos given political asylum to several OPM leaders" 
[Sydney Morning Herold, 23 June, 1986]. 
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Colonel Yunus Yusfiah, Commander 
of East Timor 
Colonel YunusYusfioh,Korem 164 WiroDhormocommonder. 
(Tempo, 19 July, 1986) 
1t was only when Australian journalists visited East 
Timor in Morch this year that East Timor's new military 
commander mode his first public appearance. Appointed 
commander of Korem 164 WiraDharma, the East Timor sub-
regional military command, on 18 December last year, 
Colonel Yunus Yusfiah has shown on several occasions that 
he likes the limelight. Introducing himself to the 
visiting journalists as 'Joe', he projected a congenial 
image, talkative, and at ease with westerners. 
He is evidently an officer with a bright future, being 
the first of his 1965 class of AMN (National Military 
Academy) graduates to have reached the position of Korem 
commander, the next in 1 ine below the ten regional 
commands. During his relatively short military career, 
'Joe' has passed through al 1 the necessary steps to take 
him right to the top of the army. 
He has served for much of the time as a member of the 
red-beret para-commandos (Kopassus) which is where he 
storted, but has alternated as on infantry officer in a 
regular territorial division. This is a rather unusual 
combination, but fits him particularly well for East 
Timor where both strike-force and terri toriol troops are 
always actively involved at an operational level. 
Lobato's killer 
His prospects began to leapfrog in late 1978, when as a 
young officer in the 744 battalion, his unit tracked down 
and killed Nicolau Lobato, the Fretilin leader. According 
to Tempo (19 July), he was the one responsible for 
murdering Lobato, and was there to receive the warm 
congratulations of General Moh. Yusuf, Armed Forces 
commander-in-chief, who rushed to the scene from Jakarta, 
to be photographed with Loboto's body. 
This event was also recorded on video, and Tempo 
relates that often, during his moments of relaxation, 
Colonel Yusuf tokes out his video to savour that moment 
of triumph. 
In 1979, he married on East Timorese woman, and soon 
after, he was sent to the prestigious Staff and Command 
School in Fort Leavenworth, USA, a rare boost for up-ond-
coming officers. 
Back from the US, he returned to his native region, to 
becomesecond-in-commandof the Kopossussquad located in 
Ujung Pondong, one of the three Kopossus squads in the 
country. In the early eighties, he was summoned to serve 
again in East Timor, this time as on infantry commander. 
After two years as battalion commander. he again donned 
his red beret, to be appointed Operational Assistant of 
Kopassus. 
Before going on to become Korem 164 commander lost 
year, he notched up yet another important achievement, by 
being selected for a course at the Army's Staff and 
Command School in Bandung. 
MILITARY PROFILE 
The strike-force/territorial combination 
Colonel Yunus is showing his ability to use the two 
elements that have shaped his military progress. His 
personal motto is that "an officer must be fit, not fat", 
and insists that his troops do regular, rigorous physical 
training in the hills of East Timor. 
Next to his determination to hunt down and kill more 
guerrillas, 'Joe' is out to convince everyone that his 
primary concern is to teach the Timorese to grow more 
food. Thus, he told Tempo, all military commands down to 
the babinsa level [village military post] are under 
orders to cultivate "model gardens", as an example to the 
camp dwellers. Already, he claims, 500 of these gardens, 
varying in size from 250 square metres to one hectare, 
have been set up. It is his conviction that, in 3 or 4 
years, he will be able to bring the East Timorese to a 
state of food self-sufficiency, while at the same time 
preventing people from being tempted to support the 
guerrillas. 
Quite apart from the cynical assumption that Timorese 
need to be taught things that they have been doing for 
generations, this new-style hearts and minds policy 
reveals a desperation on the part of the Korem commander 
to entice the population away from the guerrillas, and 
incidentally, shows up for false claims that there are no 
food problems in East Timor. 
No doubt, Colonel Yunus will be expected to show 
results soon, and he has had more than enough experience 
of East Timor to make his superiors confident that he 
will. After nearly eleven years of war, there must be 
plenty of people who think that it's about time too. 
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Suharto and his generals 
A remarkable meeting took place on 7 July in Jakarta, 
between General Suharto and the entire top leadership of 
the Indonesian Armed Forces. The twenty-two senior 
officers from the four forces, the Army, Novy, Air Force 
and Police, led by Armed Forces commander-in-chief, 
General Benny Murdoni, all consist, for the first time in 
the history of the Republic, of men from a generation 
that is not Suharto's generation. 
These men graduated in the late fifties or early 
sixties, and with hardly any exceptions, hove never hod 
the 'privilege' of serving directly under Suharto and 
enjoying his patronage. The exceptions ore General 
Murdoni, who is nearing retirement age, and Lieutenont-
General Try Sutr isno, Army chief-of-staff, who was 
Suharto's personal aide in the mid seventies. 
The 7 July meeting followed a period of mounting 
criticism, directed towards Suharto and his regime, 
prompting him to summon his general staff and do some 
explaining. A comparison could be drown with a similar 
occurrence in 1980, when Suharto strongly denied charges 
of corruption in a speech to territorial commanders. On 
that occasion, he struck bock, hitting out at his 
opponents, re-affirming his commanding position and 
inflicting damage on those who hod dared to challenge his 
outhori ty. 
The 1986 re-run, however, was a different affair. 
Suharto appeared to be very much on the defensive, 
locking the determination and confidence he hos shown 
ever since he seized power more than twenty years ago. 
He defended himself on many fronts, against the attack 
in the Sydney Morning Herold, against calls for a limit 
to the number of terms a president may serve, against 
criticisms of his dubious role in on attack on Jogjakarta 
in 1949, against the worldwide criticism of his pet 
project, transmigration, against charges of human rights 
abuses, and against comparisons being mode between him 
and 110 fallen president in a neighbouring country". 
Strange to soy, however, it was left to General Murdoni 
to inform the general public of the gist of what Suharto 
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Solutes (while seated) for Suharto from the generals who 
heard his defences against mounting criticism. [Photo: 
Kompas, 8 July, 1986] 
hod said. He sow these attacks on many fronts as a grand, 
worldwide conspiracy, del iberotely timed to coincide with 
the regeneration of the Armed Forces leadership and the 
general elections of April 1987. 
As rumours fly around in Jakarta about the growing 
rivalry between the factions of General Murdoni on the 
one hand and General Sudhormono on the other, there ore 
unm istokoble signs that the ageing Suharto is becoming 
more and more lonely at the top, surrounded by a 
generation of generals none of whom con be regarded as 
his trusties. 
For from the roaring Suharto of 1980, barking out 
orders, he appeared this time to be pleading for 
understanding from those on whom he must now rely to 
carry his regime forward. 
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